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BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In its prior opinion in this case, this Court left several issues unresolved other than
the rescission issue which is the primary focus of Defendant Doms' brief. See Anderson
v. Doms. Case No. 920653CA, Slip op. 3 n.2 (Utah App. 1994). Therefore, on their
cross-appeal, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-appellants, Ellen Anderson, et al. (hereinafter
Anderson" or "Plaintiffs") present the following issues for review:
1. Was Doms not entitled to damages because he did not own the entire property?
Standard of Review: This issue involves a conclusion of law made by the trial court. A
trial court's conclusions and legal interpretations are afforded no deference and are
reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465, (Utah 1991). This
issue was preserved for appellate review in this Court's prior opinion in this case.
Anderson v. Doms. Case No. 920653 CA slip op. at 3n. 2. (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
2. Did Doms' election of rescission preclude a subsequent trial on damages?
Standard of Review: This issue involves a conclusion of law. A trial court's conclusions
and legal interpretations are afforded no deference and are reviewed for correctness.
Scharfv. BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This issue was preserved for
review when plaintiffs requested that the trial court order Doms to elect the remedy he
1

chose to pursue. (R. 4124-39).
3. Did the trial court deprive plaintiffs Anderson and Scott of benefits to which they were
entitled under the trust deed note?
Standard of Review: This issue involves a conclusion of law which is afforded no
deference and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464,465, (Utah
1991). This issue was preserved for review during the trial on the issue of damages.
(Addendum 2).
4. Did the trial court improperly offset Doms' damages against those owed to plaintiffs ?
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law and legal interpretations are
afforded no deference and are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This issue was preserved for review in plaintiffs objections to
the trial court's proposed conclusions. (R. 6919).
5. Did the court err in concluding that the statute of limitations did not bar Doms'
counterclaim?
Standard of Review:

This issue involves a conclusion of law which is afforded no

deference by a reviewing court and is reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp..
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This issue was preserved for review in plaintiffs
memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment (R. 3422-25).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules relevant to this case is
contained in the text or the addenda.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
When defendants Doms and McCoy failed to make payments required by a trust
deed note secured by property known as Rossi Hills in Summit County, plaintiffs Scott and
the Estate of D. C. Anderson filed an action to foreclose the trust deed as a mortgage. (R.
1-9) A default judgment was entered against both defendants on January 21, 1988. (R.3440) Four months later, on April 22, 1988, defendant Doms moved the court to set aside
the judgment. (R. 49-52) The court granted Doms1 motion and on June 20, 1988, entered
an order setting aside the judgment with respect to Doms.1 (R. 126,7)
Before the motion to set aside the default judgment had been filed, Doms filed an
answer and counterclaim on January 29, 1988. (R. 41) However, to comply with the
conditions for removal of the default judgment, Doms had to file a certificate of
compliance which stated that the answer and counterclaim were not "officially accepted"
by the trial court until June 1, 1988. (R. 76-78) On June 15, 1988, Doms filed an
amended counterclaim, asserting only a claim for rescission. (R. 102-05) A seconded
amended counterclaim contained causes of action for rescission, lost profits and fraud.2

1

On October 21, 1988, the court issued an order of sale directing the sale of
McCoy's interest. After timely notice and publication, McCoy's one-half interest was
sold on December 12, 1988. After a hearing, an amended deficiency judgment was
entered against McCoy on January 24, 1991. (R. 5146-7) McCoy did not contest the
default judgment or the deficiency judgment and is not a party to any appeal.
2

Significantly, Doms1 second amended counterclaim did not seek damages for
breach of the covenants contained in the deed but referred to the alleged breach only as
a ground for rescission.
3

(R. 237)
Following motions for dismissal and summary judgment, all of which were denied,
plaintiffs demanded that Doms elect his remedy. Thereafter, at the commencement of the
trial on April 17, 1990, and during the trial, the motion was renewed and Doms elected
to proceed on rescission. (R. 7087, 7759) On April 30, 1990, Judge Rokich issued a
memorandum decision in which he held that rescission was not available to Doms. (R.
4244 et seq.) Over the objection of plaintiffs, the trial court reconvened for the purpose
of determining if a violation of the covenant against encumbrances existed and, if one was
found, deterrruning damages even though Doms had not pleaded the contract action. (R.
7753 et seq.) The bench trial was held on August 21, 1990. On October 4, 1990, the
court issued the first of five memorandum decisions involving the contract claims. (R.
4348 et seq.) Finally, on June 23, 1992, the court issued its final Second Amended
Findings and Conclusions and Second Amended Judgment. (R. 6874 et seq.; Addendum
2) . Final judgment was entered on June 23, 1992. (R. 6900-6907)
Both parties appealed the trial court's judgment. On November 4, 1994, the court
of appeals issued a memorandum decision resolving many of the issues raised on appeal.
Anderson v. Doms. Case No. 920653CA (Utah Ct. App. filed Nov. 4,1994) (Addendum
1.) The court did not resolve all the issues however and remanded the case "for the
purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any
delays in Doms pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find from the evidence
presented that the appellants were prejudiced by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches
4

should not bar the remedy of rescission." Anderson, slip op. at 3 (Addendum 1).
However, the court also noted that if the trial court did not rescind the transaction, the
trial court's
findings and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the intervening
conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to pursue his
counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment entered against McCoy
and the sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills on Doms's
ownership interest in the property and any damages for breach of the title
warranties.
Anderson, Slip op. at 3 n.2. In other words, if the trial court did not find rescission, it
was required to reexamine and support its conclusions on a variety of issues some of which
concerned whether Doms, in fact, properly held title to the property.3
On remand, the trial court received filings from both sides and held a hearing to
resolve the outstanding issues. It then issued findings and conclusions on May 31, 1996,
which denied Doms's claim for rescission. (R. 8335; AddendumlO) The court then entered
an order on Sept. 8,1997, which concluded that Doms held clear title to the property. (R.
8533-36; Addendum 11) Both parties again appealed the trial court's rulings.
FACTS
This case involves undeveloped property, known as Rossi Hills, in Summit County.
It was owned by plaintiffs Scott and Anderson as tenants in common. (Exhibit 27) 4

3

Doms does not acknowledge this portion of the court's opinion in his brief.

4

All exhibits referred to in this brief were admitted at trial. Exhibit lists are
contained in R7081-82 and R437-38.
5

Eugene Doms, through real estate agent Michael Sloan, made offers on behalf of
himself and Michael R. McCoy to purchase Rossi Hills. (Exhibit 63) The sale was
consummated and a deed was executed by Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott, and D.
C. Anderson and his wife, Ellen Anderson, as grantors, in favor of Doms and McCoy, as
grantees, each with an undivided one-half interest. (Exhibit 1) On the March 10, 1982,
Doms and McCoy executed a trust deed note in the amount of $194,250.00 in favor of "D.
C. Anderson as to an undivided one-half interest, and Dan Scott as to an undivided
one-half interest." (Exhibit 3) The note was secured by a trust deed executed by Doms
and McCoy on the same date in favor of Scott and Anderson. (Exhibit 2)
Michael Sloan, a real estate agent, testified that he and Doms walked the property
in advance of the sale and observed the loop road and the other features later claimed to
be undisclosed encumbrances. (R.6883) Sloan testified that all claimed encroachments
were plainly visible. (R. 7653, 7658, 7661, 7662, 7663, 7664, 7667, 7686)
On October 30, 1981, five months before their purchase of Rossi Hills, Doms and
McCoy created a corporation called Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibit 31)

The

corporation held annual meetings for the years 1983 (Exhibit 35), 1984 (Exhibit 36), 1985
(Exhibit 37). Doms and McCoy, through Domcoy, conducted a substantial amount of real
estate business in of Utah as indicated by their attorney. (R. 7539-41; 7560)
On August 30, 1983, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy
Enterprises.

(Exhibit 16)

Shortly thereafter, Domcoy developed a joint venture

agreement for the development of Rossi Hills and other adjacent properties. (Exhibits 81,
6

82) From 1982 Domcoy failed to pay the real estate taxes on the Rossi Hills property,
and a tax sale was conducted. (Exhibit 5 to the Complaint in consolidated case #10066.)
Doms, McCoy and Domcoy failed to make payments required by the trust deed note under
the note which precipitated the foreclosure action. (Exhibit 6)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In response to this Court, the trial court issued extensive findings and
conclusions to support its ruling that rescission was not available to Doms. Plaintiffs assert
that Doms has not marshaled the evidence on appeal to demonstrate the court's findings
are clearly erroneous. Rescission was unavailable to Doms because he did not own and,
therefore, could not tender the property. Doms waived his right to rescission by failing
to promptly request it. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court's findings demonstrate that
Doms had no basis for rescission and that they were prejudiced by Doms' delay in
requesting it and that the parties cannot be returned to their original positions.
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court correctly denied Doms' request for attorney
fees. The trial court properly determined that Doms was not the prevailing party. Doms'
other claims surrounding attorney fees, therefore, also fail.
The trial court's award of attorneys fees was correct. As the prevailing party,
plaintiffs were clearly entitled to the fees, but that amount should be augmented.
On their cross-appeal, plaintiffs raise a number of issues left either unresolved by
this Court's prior opinion or not addressed by that opinion, and one issue which should be
re-examined. Plaintiffs assert that intervening conveyances subsequent to the conveyance
7

to Doms and McCoy demonstrate that Doms was not entitled to damages because he owned,
at most, one-half of the property. Doms' election of rescission as his remedy should have
foreclosed the subsequent trial on damages. Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit provided
in the trust deed which should not have ben modified by the court. The court should not
have offset the damages against plaintiffs against the balance owed by Doms because this
changed the terms of the contract. Finally, an over-arching issue - whether the trial court
was correct in its conclusions concerning the statute of limitations - should be re-examined.
If, as plaintiffs contend, the trial court was wrong in its conclusions concerning the statute
of limitations, the unique facts of mis case require that Doms' action be dismissed. This
conclusion should have been reached by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
(Response to Doms' Point I)
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT RESCISSION WAS NOT
AVAILABLE TO DOMS.
In the initial appeal, the court of appeals noted that the trial court had made findings
concerning Doms' delay in bringing the action for rescission, but stated that the trial court
made no findings as to whether Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the delay. Anderson. Slip op.
at 2. On this basis, this Court remanded the case for the purpose of entering findings on
whether plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms' delays in pursuing rescission. Id.
On remand, the trial court made extensive findings regarding rescission, not only on
the issues of prejudice, but on all facets of the issue of rescission. (R. 8535-52; Addendum
8

10). The supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the issue of
rescission deal extensively with the rescission issue. However, in his brief, Doms attacks
the findings of fact as insufficient and irrelevant. Brief of Appellant at 19-30. Because of
this, Doms, while claiming to be aware of his burden to marshal the evidence to challenge
findings of fact, states that because in his view, the findings are inadequate, he should
automatically be granted rescission.5 Doms' assertion, made with no legal support, is
wrong for a variety of reasons. First, Doms has ignored the correct standard of review,
Doms has also ignored relevant findings made by the court which demonstrate the lack of
any basis for rescission, Doms has identified the wrong remedy even if the trial court's

5

Throughout Doms' brief is an undisguised attack on the fairness of the trial
court. However, in doing so, Doms repeatedly takes the trial court's statements out of
context. For example, Doms states that "at the October 27, 1995 hearing on remand,
the trial court began the proceeding by stating, 'it appears to me from reading (the Utah
Court of Appeals memorandum) that the issue here is with regard to rescission... I
thought I made that quite clear that I would not allow the rescission at the time we
started this case.' " Brief of Appellant at 20. Doms then attempts to make this appear
that the trial court was prejudiced before the hearing started. In fact, immediately
following the quotation given by Doms, the following exchange occurred:
Mr. Biele: You did.
Mr. Keller: Your Honor, if I may. We are the moving party initially. We filed the
first motion to implement the court of appeals decision. I would like to have an
opportunity to explain that to you if you will let me.
The Court: Yes. I just wanted to know that is the issue.
(Emphasis added). In other words, what Doms portrays as prejudice on the part of the
trial court is nothing more than a judicial inquiry regarding the basis for the hearing.
Interestingly, while Doms attacks the fairness of the trial judge, he did not
appeal the issue of judicial prejudice which he unsuccessfully raised in the trial court.
If Doms is claiming judicial prejudice, that should have been raised as a separate issue,
not disguised as "pot-shots" taken at the trial judge in this forum.
9

findings are insufficient, and, finally, Doms has ignored separate, independent bases
supported by the trial court's findings which preclude rescission.
A. This Court should not consider the issue of rescission because Doms has not marshaled
the evidence to demonstrate that thefindingsare clearly erroneous.
Doms acknowledges that the correct standard of review for an appellate court is that
the findings of fact should not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. However,
Doms then states that he will ignore the standard of review on this appeal because, in his
view, the findings are insufficient.

Before discussing prejudice, the trial court made

important, relevant findings directiy related to the rescission issue which impact that issue.
In its supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found, inter alia:
1. The real estate transaction between the plaintiffs and defendants related
to the Rossi Hills Property in Summit County, State of Utah, was an armslength transaction conducted in good faith and wherein the defendant Doms
had full knowledge of the encumbrances and, as heretofore found, there was
no fraud or misrepresentation involved in this sale.
2. Doms determined that the property value could be enhanced if it was
developed with two other adjoining parcels and purchased an interest in one
of the adjoining parcels, Slipper Parcel, so that an integrated development
could take place, and he proceeded to try to develop the properties even
though he had no experience in that area.
3. Doms did not raise the issue of rescission at the time of conveyance from
him and McCoy to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on August 30, 1983, nor did he
raise the issue of rescission when he requested and obtained a warranty deed
to the property from Domcoy on August 20, 1988. Doms' actions and
conduct indicated he wanted to own the subject property despite the
encroachments and prescriptive easements and did not act to rescind the
transaction.
4. The findings of fact heretofore made by this Court found that Doms had
familiarized himself with the property, knew of the encroachments, the loop
10

road and that the development could be enhanced if developed with two other
adjoining parcels. Doms proceeded to try and develop the property even
though he had no experience in developing real estate and was unfamiliar
with land development in the Park City area.
5. It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a
quick profit and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound
economic evaluation for the development of the property.
(Supplemental Findings of Fact, #1-6; R.8535-52; AddendumlO) Other pertinent findings
on Doms' rescission claims and the prejudice suffered by Plaintiffs are reproduced below.
For the most part, Doms1 claims concerning the trial court's ruling on the issue of
rescission are attacks on the sufficiency of the findings of the trial court. However, some
of the findings set forth above and others which have not been set out here which form the
basis for the trial court's conclusions that Doms was barred by his own lack of diligence
from rescinding the transaction are not even mentioned in Doms' brief. Doms' failure to
confront these critical findings means that he has also not demonstrated them to be clearly
erroneous by marshaling the evidence which support them and showing that the evidence
is insufficient.

Doms picks and chooses among findings, attacking their relevancy.

However, in many instances, even those findings Doms admits are factually correct.
This Court has stated that failure of an appellant to marshal the supporting evidence
or presentation of merely contradictory evidence is an adequate basis for affirming the trial
court. West Valley Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991).
On that basis, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on rescission.
The findings set forth by the court in its Supplemental Findings and Conclusions are
sufficient. This Court has previously stated that if findings are so inadequate that they
11

cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations, the appellant is relieved of his
duty to marshal die evidence in an attack on me findings. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d
474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court however then stated that findings in that case
were inadequate because they provided "no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial
court's decision and render appellate review unfeasible." Woodward. 823 P.2d at 478.
Despite Doms' claims that some of the findings are irrelevant, when the findings are read
together, they provide insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision and
render effective review possible. In many instances Doms does not dispute me validity of
a finding but merely concludes that it is "irrelevant." Relevancy should be viewed in
context which Doms refuses to do. Doms' relevancy arguments are therefore misleading.
For example, Doms states mat finding of fact lOd is unsupported by the record.
That finding states that Doms waited more than six years before he sought rescission of the
transaction. Throughout his brief, Doms contends mat his settlement offer in January 1985
indicated his intent to rescind. However, several problems surround the 1985 date. First,
Doms cannot point to any written offer to rescind before June 1988. Further, the settlement
offer which Doms describes was made at a time when Doms had no right, title or interest
in the real estate. If the offer of setdement could be considered an offer of rescission and
tender the property, me offer would have to have been made by Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.,
the then-record tide owner. Doms did not make any offer of rescission until after he filed
his counterclaim in me suit to foreclose a trust deed, and then, he did not own the property
and could not have made an appropriate tender. The 1988 date for rescission in me
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findings is supported by Doms' counterclaims. (R237-42)
In short, Doms' assertion that the findings are inadequate and therefore he should
not have to marshal the evidence is simply unsupportable when the findings are examined
as a whole. Domsf failure to marshal the evidence in an attack on the findings should, in
and of itself, be sufficient basis for this Court to affirm on the issue of rescission.
B. Even ifDoms' assertions with respect to thefindingsare correct, he is not entitled to
rescission, but rather a remand for entry of sufficient findings.
Doms concludes that if the trial court's findings are insufficient, then he is entitled
to rescission ordered by this Court. In fact, Doms can cite no case in which this Court has
ever authorized or ordered such a remedy. When this Court has determined that findings
were insufficient, it has remanded the case for the entry of sufficient findings.
For example, in Woodward, this Court remanded the case for more detailed
findings, after instructing the trial court concerning the content of its findings. Woodward,
823 P.2d at 479. In In Re Estate of Ouinn v. Ouinn, 830 P.2d 282, 286 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) this Court stated,w unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly supports the trial
court's decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact precludes appellate review of the
evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and requires remand for a more
detailed findings by the trial court." In only one instance, has this Court, over a strong
dissent, stated that remand is unnecessary-when findings on a particular factual issue are
unnecessary because the evidence concerning the issue is undisputed.

Levitz v.

Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, after this statement
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appeared in Levitz. the court canvassed the record and found disputed evidence which made
affirmance as a matter of law impossible.

Levitz. 877 P.2d at 1248. The court held

remand to the trial court for entry of additional findings was required.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court's findings on rescission are sufficient. However,
even if Doms is correct and the trial court's findings are insufficient, the proper remedy is
not reversal, but remand for entry of detailed findings with directions from this Court on
the content of those findings. Indeed, Doms cites no case in which a Utah court has
reversed a trial court and ordered entry of a judgment based on inadequate findings
C. Rescission was not available to Doms because he did not own and therefore, could not
tender the subject property.
Doms fails to address a critical issue which was resolved in the trial court's
supplemental findings and conclusions. That issue concerns the ownership of the parcel.
At the time Doms filed his pleadings requesting rescission he had no right, title or interest
in Rossi Hills. Doms and McCoy had originally owned the property as tenants in common
(R. 8533-36; Addendum 11), but they had transferred their interest in the property to
Summit County Title Company as trustee (Exhibit 2), and thereafter, they transferred any
unencumbered interest in the property to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. by warranty deed, dated
August 20, 1983. (Exhibit 16; Addendum 11). Subsequently, as a result of Domcoy's
failure to pay taxes, the property was sold to Summit County on May 27, 1987.
A contract cannot be rescinded unless the seller and the buyer can be placed in the
original positions which existed before die contract.
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50 West Broadway Assoc, v.

Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1989). In cases involving transfers
of property, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "The law is well-settled that one electing
to rescind a contract must tender back to the other contracting party whatever property of
value he has received." Perry v. WoodalL 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968).
In this case because Doms had transferred the property before the rescission offer,
he did not have title and could not tender the property as part of a rescission offer.
Therefore, the rescission offer itself was a non-sequitur. As an additional complicating
factor, Doms originally only received an undivided one-half interest in the property and
McCoy, the other one-half owner, has made no appearance in this case and has not made
any request for rescission. Further, Doms could not correct any tide deficiency because
the one-half interest in the property owned by his partner was sold at a sheriff's sale and
is now not available to Doms, so rescission is not available. (R. 46; 568-9; 1200-03)
Therefore, a question arises concerning Doms1 ability to rescind one half of a contract.
In its supplemental findings of fact, the trial court stated: "From August 30, 1983
through the date of the tax sale on May 27, 1987 . . . the corporation, Domcoy Enterprises,
Inc., was the sole owner of the Rossi Hills property . . . . The defendant Doms did not reacquire any interest in Rossi Hills property until August 20, 1988 . . .."
(R. 8353-52; Addendum 10). Because of these findings, the trial court, in its supplemental
conclusions, concluded that rescission was not available because, inter alia, joint action by
co-owners is required, it was not possible to return all parties to the status quo because
McCoy's one-half interest had been sold, and neither Doms nor McCoy had ownership
15

rights when Doms attempted to rescind, therefore, he could not tender the property.
(R. 8353-52; AddendumlO). Because of these conclusions and die supporting findings, the
trial court's decision that rescission was unavailable should be affirmed by this Court
because Doms did not own the property and thus, could not tender it back to plaintiffs.
D. The court's supplemental findings demonstrate the Doms had no basis for rescission.
Rescission is an equitable remedy which is available to a party only if the party has
some basis to invoke it. Rescission is permitted only under limited circumstances including
unilateral mistake, Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah App. 1993), which is
not applicable in this case, or in the case of breach or fraud or misrepresentation. See.
e.g.. Coalville Citv v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah App. 1997).

Furthermore,

rescission is inappropriate when a legal remedy such as damages is adequate. Coalville
Citv 930 P.2d at 1210; Erisman v. Overman. 358 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1961). In other
words, there must be some basis for the party to invoke the remedy of rescission. In this
case, as the supplemental findings adequately demonstrate, Doms had no such basis.
The trial court specifically found Doms' claims for rescission were based on two
theories—first, that Doms claimed he was entitled to rescission because of a violation of the
covenants against encumbrances as contained in the warranty deed, and second, that Doms
was entitled to rescission based on fraud. (R. 8535-52; Addendum 10). However, die trial
court also determined that Doms had full knowledge of the encumbrances before he
purchased die property. Intiiiscase, me evidence shows that before the sale Doms viewed
the property in the company of a real estate agent who drove him into the property over the
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easement that Doms later claimed violated the deed covenants and the intrusions or
encumbrances were known to him. (R. 7661, 7664, 7667-8) Indeed, the trial court
specifically found that Doms knew "there were roads and sheds on the property" and that
Doms had "actual knowledge of the easement encroachments" before he entered in the
transaction. (R. 6883) Because this finding, which Doms does not dispute, is adequately
supported by the evidence, Doms1 first basis for asserting that he was entitled to rescission,
that the covenants against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed had been violated,
is insupportable. Therefore, the trial court had ample reason to deny rescission to Doms.
The trial court also found that Domsf second theory for asserting rescission, fraud,
was also inapplicable. Specifically, the trial court found in its supplemental findings that
there was "no fraud or misrepresentation involved in the sale." (R. 8535-52;Addendum
10). The court concluded Doms had produced insufficient evidence to prove allegations
that some of the plaintiffs had made material misrepresentations concerning Rossi Hills. (R.
6896). This conclusion was based, in part, on the statement of Doms1 counsel during the
second trial that Doms did not "intend to call any witnesses with respect to fraud and
misrepresentation, and that should resolve that." (R. 7763) Therefore, as admitted by
Doms himself, his second basis for invoking rescission is without support.
Since there was no breach and nofraudor misrepresentation in this case, the remedy
of rescission was unavailable to Doms as the trial court correctly ruled.
E. Doms1 failure to properly request rescission waived his right to rescission.
The trial court1 s reasoning was partly based on Doms1 failure to promptly to request
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rescission. Rescission is an equitable remedy and therefore, to repair damage as quickly
as possible by restoring the parties to their original positions, courts have always required
prompt notification of intent to rescind. Doms has argued that his notice of rescission was
promptly made after he "obtained knowledge" of the encumbrances. However, Doms has
admitted that the rescission request was not filed for at least three years after the purchase.6
Doms knew of the encumbrances before he purchased the property. The trial court
found that Doms knew that "there were roads and sheds on the property." (R. 6883) The
court specifically found that Doms had "actual notice of the easement encroachments
between October 22, 1981 and November 7, 1981" and that Doms' subsequent actions
demonstrate that he had "personal knowledge of the road encroachments no later than
October of 1982." (R. 6883) Finally, the court found that Doms "knew or should have
known at the time he purchased the Rossi Hills property and the Slipper Parcel that the
integrated development of the three parcels had failed..." (R. 6882) Based on these and
other findings, the court concluded that Doms waited an unreasonable time after he had
knowledge of the road and other encroachments to seek rescission and therefore, rescission
was barred. However, this Court refused to accept the unconscionable delay as a sufficient
basis for the trial court's conclusion that rescission was not available to Doms.
In fact, unreasonable delay alone may support denial of a rescission claim. Doms

6

In fact, as the trial court found, Doms' lack of ownership of the property
prevented his tender of the property until mid-1988. For the purposes of this section of
the argument only however, plaintiffs assume that Doms' request appeared when he
said it did, in 1985.
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has relied primarily on Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990)
to argue that his long wait before seeking rescission did not evidence a lack of diligence on
his part. Doms has stated that in Breuer-Harrison, this Court affirmed the trial court's
granting of rescission even though the buyers had delayed five years in seeking rescission
after they obtained knowledge of an easement. Doms1 interpretation of Breuer-Harrison
is inaccurate. In Breuer-Harrison. the court's opinion stated that evidence established that
the buyers did not know of an underground easement across the property, which they had
purchased in 1979, until "sometime in 1983." 799P.2dat724. The opinion further stated
that the buyersfirstraised the "option of rescinding the contract" in August, 1984, perhaps
less than one year after discovery of the easement. 799 P.2d at 722. Therefore, contrary
to Doms' claim, Breuer-Harrison does not support his position that a five-year wait for a
rescission is permissible, rather, Breuer-Harrison. supports the proposition that buyers must
act promptly in seeking rescission. This was the trial court's position here.
In Perrv.485 P.2d at 815, and Erisman. 358 P.2d at 87, the Utah Supreme Court
held that a delay of mere months in exercising a decision to rescind was a sufficient delay
to prohibit invocation of the remedy of rescission. In this case, at least three years expired
before the corporation Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., discussed settlement with plaintiff's
attorneys and more than six years before Doms individually requested rescission. Doms
simply waited too long to invoke rescission as found by the trial court. The trial court was
correct in its conclusion that Doms was therefore barred from invoking rescission.
Doms' attempts to justify his unreasonable delay in seeking rescission by arguing that
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plaintiffs' misrepresentations "induced him to purchase Rossi Hills" and form a basis for
rescission. In making this argument, as noted above, Doms fails to acknowledge that (1)
he introduced insufficient evidence of any misrepresentation, (2) the trial court found that
Doms was aware of the actual facts surrounding the property at least four months before
he purchased the property, (3) Doms' continued payments after he knew of the facts waived
any claim of rescission, and (4) the case law holds that a party seeking rescission based on
misrepresentation must act within a reasonable time after the truth is revealed.
The trial court found that Doms had produced insufficient evidence to prove his
allegations that the plaintiffs had made material representations concerning Rossi Hills. (R.
6896) Doms simply fails to recognize these findings by the trial court. Doms clearly did
not act promptly to rescind.
F. The trial court properly found Plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms' delay.
As directed by this Court on remand, the trial court entered findings on prejudice.
Specifically, the trial court found:
10. The first offer for rescission by either of the defendant parties was made
by Doms through the filings of his second amended counterclaim on or about
June, 1988, which was more than six years after the completion of the
purchase agreement and after he obtained knowledge of the claimed defects.
The court found and now finds that this is a grossly unreasonable delay in
requesting rescission for the following reasons:
a. Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs. He purchased the Slipper Parcel and attempted to formulate a plan
for a three-parcel integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The
plaintiffs are now foreclosed from developing an integrated development
because Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel, and the likelihood of
Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated development is remote.
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b. Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984,
1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and required the plaintiffs to
initiate legal action to clear the title.
c. D.C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction, died while Doms
was in possession of the property, thus making it impossible to elicit
testimony from the decedent.
d. Domsf delay of more than six years before he sought to rescind the
transaction adversely affected the plaintiffs1 opportunity to resolve the
encroachment and easement problems because witness would be unavailable
and memories were dimmed by the lapse of time.
e. During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. and Summit
County were in possession of the property, the property suffered at 50%
reduction in its value.
f.
Doms1 inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the
property impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of a downturn in the real
estate market and the increased costs to develop the property if they choose
to do so.
g. Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the
plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable.
h. Doms was in default; therefore could not invoke the doctrine of
rescission.
(R. 8535-52; Addendum 10).
Rather than being irrelevant, as claimed by Doms, these findings directly
demonstrate the prejudice suffered by the plaintiffs due to Doms' delay in requesting
rescission. For example, Finding 10a noted first that Doms had the benefit of the property
to the exclusion of the plaintiffs during the six-year period between the time of the purchase
and the time of tender of the rescission offer. This portion of Finding 10a is directly
derived from Taylor v. Moore, which clearly states that a party is not allowed to "go on
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deriving all possible benefits from the transaction, and then claim to be relieved of his own
obligations by seeking its rescission." 51 P.2d at 227 quoting 4 R.C.L. 514. In Taylor,
the Utah Supreme Court explained that an extended period of dominion over land evidenced
incidents of ownership which are inconsistent with rescission and are detrimental and
prejudicial to the other party. The same types of benefits were derived by Doms and
Domcoy and were detrimental and prejudicial to Plaintiffs' ownership as the court found.
Furthermore, the second portion of Finding 10a noted that Doms had acquired the
Slipper Parcel from a third party and attempted to formulate a plan for a three-parcel
integrated development that was unsuccessful.

The finding stated that Plaintiffs are

foreclosed from developing an integrated development, which is the only possible use for
the land because of Doms' interest in the slipper parcel. Indeed, this demonstrates that
while Doms exercised dominion over the land on which he now seeks rescission, the
character of the surrounding lands changed by virtue of the change in ownership of the
lands. Doms' attempts to develop an integrated development have spoiled the chances of
plaintiffs ever being able to make such a development. Because of the immovable positions
of the parties which developed during the pendency of this litigation and because of Doms'
acquisition of the slipper parcel, any potential development of the land is now impossible
to the prejudice of the plaintiffs.
Finding 10b stated that Doms failed to pay property taxes on the property for a
period of five years which resulted in a tax sale and required plaintiffs to initiate legal
action to clear title. This prejudiced plaintiffs because they were required to enter and
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defend land which they thought they had sold. Because of Doms' failure to pay taxes the
land could have been sold to a third party adverse to both Doms and plaintiffs, but for
plaintiffs move to clear title to the property. While plaintiffs were reimbursed for some of
the fees they expended, they were not reimbursed for all of the fees which were required
and therefore were prejudiced by Doms1 actions.
Finding 10c stated that one of the plaintiffs had died while Doms was in possession
of the property. This was prejudicial to the plaintiffs because obviously Anderson, who
significantly participated in the negotiations concerning the land, could not offer testimony
to refute Doms' claims. As noted above, if Doms is permitted to rescind, the rescission
would have to be based on one of Doms1 two theories. Either of those two theories would
have required the testimony of plaintiff Anderson. Furthermore, because any interest
Anderson had passed to his estate upon his death, the plaintiffs cannot be returned to the
status quo should rescission occur. See, e j ^ , Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156, 159
(Utah 1976) (A party was held to be prejudiced by the dying of one of the original parties
"so his testimony as to the version of transaction is no longer available." )Therefore, the
death of plaintiff Anderson has clearly prejudiced plaintiffs.
Finding lOd noted that Doms1 delay of more than six years before seeking rescission
adversely affected plaintiff's opportunities to resolve the encroachment issues and easement
problem because witnesses would be unavailable and memories would be dimmed by the
lapse of time. Legal actions by the plaintiffs to clear the encroachments and easements
should they be forced to re-acquire the property through rescission would now be virtually
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impossible. Doms did nothing in an effort to clear the encroachments and the easements.
Finding lOe stated that while Doms, Domcoy Enterprises and Summit County were
in possession of the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value. In fact,
evidence presented at the trial indicated that the value had depreciated to about 37% of the
original value by the time of Doms' action. (R. 7825, 7937) Indeed, this fact is borne out
by Doms' own actions. Doms only sought rescission when he could not develop the three
parcels, and the value of the land made it a liability rather than an asset.

In its

memorandum decision, this Court stated that decrease in value alone might not be sufficient
to establish a finding of prejudice.

However, none of the cases cited by the court

demonstrate the incredible decrease in value which occurred in this case. 7
Finding lOf also impacts on this example of prejudice. Not only has the property
decreased substantially in value during the time Doms has held the property, but because
of Doms' inept actions, any opportunity for the plaintiffs to develop the property now
would cost them considerably more.
For all of the foregoing reasons rescission was properly held by the trial court not
to be a remedy available to Doms, and this Court should affirm that ruling.
POINT H
(Response to Doms' Point II)

"In Child v. Child. 332 P.2d 981, 988 (Utah 1958), the property seemed to have
increased in value to the benefit of the party against whom rescission was sought. This
also seemed to be the case in Fitzgerald v. O'Connell. 386 A.2d 1385, 1388 (R. I.
1978). Indeed, in most instances, the property increased in value, making rescission
attractive to the party against whom it was sought. That is simply not die case here.
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DOMS IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.
On this appeal, Doms renews an argument he made in the initial appeal. Doms
argues that the Plaintiffs have assailed and disputed Doms' title to Rossi Hills in both the
main action (Civil No. 8339) and the quiet title action in the tax-sale case (Civil No.
10066). Doms therefore claims he is entitled to attorney fees incurred in sustaining his tide
to Rossi Hills. He furtiier claims that he should have prejudgment interest on the attorney
fees, that he should be awarded costs and that he should receive an award of fees for the
appeal. These claims fail for the reasons which follow.
In the trial court, Doms did not claim attorney fees because the plaintiffs "assailed
and disputed" his tide. In his "Trial Brief Regarding Issues of Prejudgment Interest and
Attorney Fees" dated January 4, 1991, Doms requested attorney fees for tiiree different
reasons: (1) as "consequential damages" resulting from plaintiffs' breach of contract, (2)
as a result of plaintiffs' breach of the earnest money agreement, and (3) because plaintiffs
had brought "meridess claims" and asserted defenses in bad faith.

(R.4051-4123)

Nowhere did Doms claim attorney fees for having to defend his "tide" to the property.
This Court cannot consider an argument which is made for the first time on appeal.
Wurst v. Dept. of Employment Sec. 818 P. 2d 1036, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("It is
well-settled that this Court will not address an issue raised for the first time on appeal.")
If the court addresses the substance of Doms' claims, they fail for the following reasons.
A.

Doms'"title" was not attacked.
Nothing in me foreclosure action (Civil No. 8339) attacks Doms' tide.
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The

foreclosure action was brought simply to foreclose on the trust deed and a trust deed note
which Doms and McCoy had signed. Doms' second amended counterclaim is based solely
on a breach of the covenant and warranties against easements and encumbrances. Nothing
is claimed with respect to a breach of a covenant of "warranty" or "quiet enjoyment" or any
other warranty or covenant other than "easements and encumbrances." Consequently,
Forrer v. Sather. 595 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1979), cited by Doms in support of his contention
that he should have received attorney fees is inapposite because that case specifically
concerned breach of the covenant of warranty. Nothing inany of the motions, memoranda,
or other documents filed by Doms in the trial court ever asserted a claim for breach of the
covenant of "warranty" or "quiet enjoyment."
Doms never requested the trial judge determine the "title" issue in the main case.
The trial judge summarized Doms argument as admitting that the property owners along
Ontario Avenue did not acquire fee title, but merely "prescriptive easements." (R. 8025)
Doms never claimed that the property owners along Ontario Avenue had any "tide."
Doms' allegations that the tax-sale case (Civil No. 10066) assailed or disputed his
tide to Rossi Hills is not accurate. Civil No. 10066 was commenced because both Doms
and his successor, Domcoy, failed to pay the taxes due under the trust deed on Rossi Hills
for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986. (R. 00041) Had the tax sale not been set
aside, the plaintiffs1 trust deed would have been extinguished by operation of law. This
made Civil No. 10066 necessary.
Consequendy, no basis exists for Doms1 statement that plaintiffs have attacked his
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"title" to the property. In Espinoza v. Safeco Title Insurance Company, 598 P.2d 346
(Utah 1979), the court clearly noted the law which has existed in Utah for over 70 years:
"[N]o attorney fees are allowable against the grantor which are incurred in the action to
recover such damages against said grantor." 598 P.2d at 348. In other words, a grantee
may not recover attorney fees against the grantor in the grantee1 s action for a breach of the
covenant against encumbrances, especially when the grantee has not paid anything to either
purchase or extinguish the encumbrances and thus, has not been damaged. Even Forrer v.
Sather, 595 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1979), cited by Doms, supports this general principle.
Since Doms never paid anything to the property owners on Ontario Avenue to
remove their loop road, sheds, fences, etc., and since he did not start any separate action
to "quiet title" to these alleged title deficiencies, there is no basis for Doms to be awarded
fees. He has no contract authorizing fees, and no statute in Utah allows such fees.
B.

Doms is not entitled to prejudgment interest or any award of attorney fees.
Doms argues he is entitled to prejudgment interest on an award of attorney fees.

This argument fails for three reasons. First, Doms is not entitled to attorney fees because
(1) there is no written contract allowing fees to Doms, (2) there is no statute allowing fees
to Doms, and (3) Doms is not entitled to fees under the third party attorney fees exception.
Even if Doms were entided to attorney fees, prejudgment interest could not be awarded
because any fees would have to be finally determined by the trial judge after an evidentiary
hearing; they cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty. See Canyon Country Store
v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989).
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C.

Doms is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Doms argues he is entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred on this appeal. Doms'

argument presumes success. No basis exists for Doms' claim for attorney fees in the trial
court and, therefore, there is no basis for awarding Doms any fees on appeal.
D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding costs to Doms.
Doms argues he is entitled to costs, including costs of depositions. The trial court
ruled that Doms was entitled to costs in the amount of $101.50. (R. 6885-86)
Doms is not entitled to any further award of costs because he is not the prevailing
party on his second amended counterclaim. The first cause of action dealing with rescission
in the counterclaim was dismissed by Judge Rokich after the first segment of the trial in
April 1990. Doms withdrew his second cause of action dealing with loss of profits for the
Rossi Hills development. (R. 7927-30). The trial court dismissed that cause of action. (R.
7930) On the third cause of action, Doms1 counsel admitted during the trial that he did not
intend to call any witnesses with respect to fraud and misrepresentation issues and invited
the court to make a ruling against him on that issue. (R. 7763-64) The court ruled that it
did not find sufficient evidence to support the fraud or misrepresentation. (R. 7763-64)
Nothing else exists in Doms' counterclaim to support an award of costs.
Deposition costs are clearly within the discretion of the trial judge and it does not
appear that any of the depositions Doms took were utilized by Doms at trial. Ames v.
Maas, 846 P.2d 468 (Utah App. 1993). Finally, Doms' request for costs regarding travel
expenses and other items in his memorandum of costs were not legitimate "costs" within
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Rule 54(d) URCP. Cornish Town v. Koller. 817 P.2d 305 (Utah 1991).
POINT m
(Response to Doms' Point HI)
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ALL THE ATTORNEY FEES
AWARDED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE PLUS ADDITIONAL FEES.
In Point HI of his brief, Doms renews an issue which he raised in his initial crossappeal-that Plaintiffs were not entitled to the fees awarded them by the trial court. This
argument fails for the following reasons.
A. Doms has failed to show that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees.
Doms correcdy states that the standard of review for an award of attorney fees is
abuse of discretion. Brief of Appellant at 1. Despite this, Doms fails to show that the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding fees to Plaintiffs. Because of the trial court's
advantaged position, the appellate court presumes that the " 'discretion of the trial court was
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows to the contrary/" Equitable Life and
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Goddard v.
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984)).
Nowhere in his opening brief does Doms ever attempt to marshal the evidence or
demonstrate that the trial court1 s findings were supported by adequate evidence and should
be sustained. Because Doms has failed to demonstrate that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in the award of attorney fees, this issue should not be considered by this Court.
B. Doms did not prevail on any of his counterclaims.
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Doms states that with the exception of two categories of attorney fees awarded by
the trial judge, ". . . all of the attorney's fees and costs awarded to Plaintiffs by the trial
court are based on the legal conclusion that Doms was in default under the trust deed and
trust deed note." Brief of Appellant at 33. Doms asserts that this conclusion was erroneous
and that this conclusion was rejected by this Court in the earlier appeal. The latter claim
is simply incorrect because this Court simply did not address the issue. With respect to the
former issue, whether the trial court's ruling was erroneous, Doms apparently
acknowledges that if this Court affirms the trial court's ruling that Doms was in default
under the trust deed and trust deed note, then, it necessarily follows the trial court's award
of the fees and costs is reasonable, necessary, and should be upheld. Doms was in default
under the trust deed note and the trust deed.
The major category of Plaintiffs' requested fees which Judge Rokich disallowed were
those pertaining to Plaintiffs' successful defense to all three causes of action in Doms'
second amended counterclaim. The court concluded the case of Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567
P.2d 168 (Utah 1977), established that a party is never entitled to any attorney fees for legal
services rendered in connection with an opposing party's counterclaim.
Plaintiffs submit Stubbs does not stand for the proposition that a party is never
entitled to attorney fees with respect to a successful defense of a counterclaim. In Stubbs,
the court held the plaintiff was not entitled to fees for defending against a counterclaim
because the plaintiff was not successful in defending against the counterclaim and because
the counterclaim did not relate to the issues raised in the plaintiff's main complaint. 567
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P.2d at 171. In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), the court not only
recognized the legal basis for, but actually awarded substantial attorney fees for all work
done by the bank's attorneys in defending against an unsuccessful counterclaim.
The defense to Doms' counterclaim for rescission was absolutely necessary as part
of the foreclosure action because without that defense, the trust deed and trust deed note
would have been rescinded and the foreclosure action would have been dismissed. The
only other cause of action in the counterclaim dealt with a loss-of-profits claim. Plaintiffs
spent a great deal of time with expert witnesses to defend against this claim. During crossexamination of Doms1 appraiser, Doms1 counsel withdrew the claim. (R. 7927-30) He
also stated he was not going to make any claim for "consequential damages." (R. 7971)
Since Plaintiffs were successful in defending against all three causes of action stated
in the counterclaim which would have eviscerated the trust deed and note, both of which
contain provisions for the award of attorney fees, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees as
the prevailing parties. The trial court also ruled Plaintiffs should be awarded costs and
expenses incurred in defending against those causes which Doms withdrew.
Dixie State Bank provides authority for an award to Plaintiffs of all attorney fees
incurred in defending against Doms1 unsuccessful second amended counterclaim. Doms
has been stubbornly litigious in the instant case, just as the defendants were in Dixie State
Bank. The best example of the "stubbornly litigious" stance taken by Doms in the instant
case can be seen in the numerous, unfounded objections which Doms filed to legitimate
discovery requests during the 1989 discovery period and the fact he withdrew or abandoned
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his second and third causes of action. (R. 7763 and 7928,30) Doms objected to virtually
all the requests for production of documents and requests for admissions submitted by
Plaintiffs. Doms' counsel also directed him not to answer questions at his deposition and
stonewalled any efforts to obtain answers to legitimate questions. Based on this hardened
stance and stubborn refusal to comply with the liberal discovery rules, Judge Frederick
levied sanctions against Doms. (R. 01739)
Because of Doms1 actions Plaintiffs were obligated to commence a third-party
complaint against Summit County Tide Company ("SCTC") in which they asked that
SCTC indemnify them for any damages which Doms was entitled to under his
counterclaim. The claim was upheld by the trial judge following a hearing on SCTC's
motion to dismiss. (R. 02943) This category of fees is not involved in the instant appeal,
however, the third-party complaint was necessary and reasonable at the time it was filed.
Doms1 statement that plaintiffs1 counsel, "Either admitted in their affidavits or in
their testimony at the hearing on attorneys fees that all of their requested fees were incurred
defending against Doms1 second amended counterclaim in the main case," is false.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3-P at the December 31, 1991, evidentiary hearing on attorney fees
demonstrates that all the fees did not relate solely to Domsf counterclaim. However, even
if they did, Plaintiffs' defenses were necessary to protect the tide and the validity of the
trust deed which authorized attorney fees for services in appearing and defending the title
to the property and the rights of the beneficiaries. (Exhibit 2, paragraph 4).
C. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred in Civil No. 10066, the tax-sale
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case. (Doms' Point IIIB)
Doms had an obligation under the trust deed to pay all taxes on Rossi Hills. He
failed to pay any of the taxes. The taxes became delinquent in 1982, and were also
delinquent for 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. On May 27, 1987, Summit County held a tax
sale to sell Rossi Hills. No one bid at the tax sale, therefore, the Summit County Auditor
conveyed the property in fee simple title to Summit County. The impact of this conveyance
was to extinguish Plaintiffs1 trust deed. See Hanson v. Burris, 46 P.2d 400, 406 (Utah
1935). Clearly, Doms and his successor corporation, Domcoy, were in default under the
terms of the trust deed with respect to the taxes, irrespective of other defaults with respect
to the monthly payments.
Doms states that he entered into a stipulation in court agreeing the tax sale could be
declared void. Doms then asserts that because of the stipulation, no attorney fees should
be given to Plaintiffs. What Doms neglects to disclose is that for the preceding year and
a half, he resisted every effort to stipulate that the sale could be set aside. He filed an
original answer and also an amended answer denying all Plaintiffs' claims for relief.
Furthermore, Doms required Plaintiffs to conduct extensive discovery, including taking the
depositions of numerous Summit County officials. Doms required Plaintiffs to prepare a
motion and memorandum for summary judgment in the tax case. After all of this and a
hearing on March 20, 1990, the court entered an order granting Plaintiffs1 motion for
summary judgment.
Doms* claim that because he "stipulated" that the tax sale could be set aside he
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should not be responsible for the payment for the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiffs is
absurd. The law is clear that even if Doms had stipulated to an amount claimed by
Plaintiffs after the lawsuit was commenced, Plaintiffs would still be entitied to their attorney
fees. Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale. 776 P.2d 643 (Utah App. 1989), Cobabe v.
Crawford. 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1988).
Doms argues there can be no attorney fees awarded for the tax case" since Doms was
excused from performance and not in default under the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note,
plaintiffs have absolutely no basis upon which to claim attorney's fees or costs." Again,
it follows that if the trial judge is right that Doms was not excused from performance but
was in default under the trust deed and the trust deed note, then all the attorney fees
incurred in the tax case should be awarded as provided in the instruments.
Furuiermore, when Doms claims that he had nothing to do with the manner in which
the tax sale was conducted, he is asking this Court to overlook the fact that he had the sole
responsibility to pay the taxes on the property, and because he neglected to do so, me
property was sold for the delinquent taxes. Doms' default in the payment of the taxes due
under the trust deed resulted in the auditor's conveying the fee simple tide to Summit
County and Doms cannot escape his responsibility for attorney fees by saying that somehow
the tax sale was a result of the conduct of mird parties.
D. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to their motions for sanctions
with respect to Doms' objections to discovery requests. (Doms' Point HIE)
In Point DTE, Doms says Judge Frederick was wrong in awarding attorney fees to
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Plaintiffs for substantial legal services made necessary because of Doms1 stubborn refusal
to answer legitimate discovery requests. These fees were awarded pursuant to Rule 37 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs submit Judge Frederick was completely justified in finding Doms violated
discovery provisions of the rules. Of the thirty-five requests for production of documents,
Doms objected to twenty-seven of them. Of the thirty-one requests for admissions
submitted to Doms, his counsel objected to fifteen of them. Thefrivolousgrounds for the
objections and the stubbornness of Doms in refusing to respond to these discovery requests
is more fully documented and discussed in "Involuntary Plaintiffs Anderson and Scott's
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Sanctions Against the Defendant Eugene E.
Doms" dated April 18, 1989. In his minute entry, Judge Frederick directed Doms, "To
respond to the discovery requests within thirty days of this minute entry ruling. Movant
is granted reasonable attorney fees for the necessity of bringing motions; amount to be
determined at trial."
After Judge Frederick entered his June 22, 1989 minute entry, Doms filed a flurry
of motions disagreeing with Judge Frederick on every point and requesting an inordinate
amount of relief. Some twenty-five pleadings were filed by Doms and Plaintiffs in
connection with this matter. On August 10, 1989, Judge Frederick issued a second minute
entry which denied all of Doms' motions. The minute entry again awarded attorney fees
to Plaintiffs. Thereafter, on August 28, 1989 (R1968-9), Judge Frederick signed an order
setting out the substance of the two prior Minute Entries and also setting forth a partial list
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of the twenty-five pleadings which were involved and for which he awarded Plaintiffs fees.
In addition to the problems caused by Doms' refusal to answer legitimate discovery
requests, Doms' counsel also advised him at his deposition on June 9, 1989, not to answer
numerous questions. These objections were based on the same reasons Doms had objected
to discovery requests. After Judge Frederick entered his rulings, it was necessary to take
a supplemental deposition of Doms which caused the Plaintiffs to incur additional expense.
Doms argues that he was not afforded an opportunity for a hearing before the amount
of fees was assessed. This assertion is simply incredible in light of the fact that an entire
day on December 31, 1991, was devoted to an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney fees.
At that time, all counsel were permitted to testify regarding the fees and to submit
affidavits or other evidence regarding the fees, costs and expenses. At the conclusion of
the hearing counsel were allowed to engage in argument regarding the fees. Plaintiffs
submit they are entitled to their full requested attorney fees of $11,875.00, together with
prejudgment interest, since all of these fees were reasonable and necessary and were
incurred because of Doms1 refusal to comply with legitimate discovery requests. E. The
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed with respect to the fees and costs awarded
to Plaintiffs, but it should be substantially augmented. (Doms Point IIIG)
In Point IIIG, Doms argues the trial court's award of $41,000.00 in attorney fees and
$358.20 in costs to Plaintiffs should be reversed. As discussed above, the attorney fees and
costs awarded are not only justified by the evidence, but are only a small part of the fees
and costs which were incurred by Plaintiffs solely because of the stubborn and litigious
nature of Doms' tactics. Plaintiffs submit they are entitled to all their attorney fees and
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court costs incurred as fully set forth in Exhibits 1-P, 3-P, 4-P, 5-P, 6-P, 7-P, and 8-P
which were introduced at the evidentiary hearing.
With respect to costs, the Rule 54(d) "costs" requested by Plaintiffs are more fully
set forth in the "Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements" dated October 22,
1991. Exhibit "7" attached to the Mcintosh Affidavit itemizes $22,866.39 in additional
"costs and expenses" which were authorized by the trust deed and the trust deed note in
addition to the Rule 54(d) costs. The trial court refused to allow any of these items, even
though the trial judge specifically stated during the trial that a portion of the costs and
expenses paid to the expert witnesses would be awarded to Plaintiffs because of Doms1
withdrawal of his second cause of action.

(R. 7928-7930) The court further admitted

during the proceedings that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees for all the work which
was done subsequent to the court's memorandum decision dated October 4,1990 and which
resulted in the court's change of heart regarding the original finding that Doms was not
excused by in performance and was not in default. (R. 6485). Under these circumstances,
Plaintiffs submit they are entitled to all the fees, costs and expenses incurred with the
exception of those fees, costs, and expenses relating to the third-party complaint against
Summit County Title Company.
Plaintiffs are also entided to their "costs and expenses," in addition to attorney fees.
These "costs and expenses" are expressly provided in the trust deed note and the trust deed
and are much broader than the Rule 54(d) "costs." The language in the trust deed note
states "If this note is collected by an attorney after default and the payment of principal or
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interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all
costs and expenses of collection, including a reasonable attorneys fee." The phrase "all
costs and expenses of collection" is much broader than the statutory provision. Paragraph
16 in the trust deed provides that upon default the beneficiary shall have the option to
declare all sums immediately due and payable and foreclose the trust deed in the manner
provided by law and "Beneficiary shall be entitled to recovery in such proceeding all costs
and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorneys fee in such amount as shall
be fixed by the court." (Addendum 4). Again, this provision allows Plaintiffs to obtain all
their "costs and expenses" incurred in the lawsuit to foreclose their trust deed.
PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-APPEAL
In its memorandum opinion in this case, this Court found several issues raised by
Plaintiffs "to be without merit." Anderson, Slip op. at 2. However, the court also noted:
Because it is possible that the trial court will order the contract
rescinded due to the lack of evidence in the record concerning prejudice, we
need not address the other claims raised. However, in the event the trial
court does not rescind the transaction, the trial court should note that its
findings and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the intervening
conveyances to andfromDomcoy on Doms's right to pursue his counterclaim
and the effect of the default judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriff's
sale of McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the
property and any damages for breach of title warranties.
Anderson, Slip op. at 3 n.2 (emphasis added). In light of the trial court's subsequent
resolution of the case after remand, Plaintiffs present the following issues.
POINT IV
DOMS IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
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BECAUSE HE ONLY OWNED AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF (%) INTEREST
SUBJECT TO THE TRUST DEED.
In order to comply with the order of the court regarding the effect of intervening
conveyances, it is necessary to examine all conveyances occurring after Doms and McCoy
acquired tide. Those conveyances include: As part of the purchase price, Doms and
McCoy transferred title to the Trustee to secure their Promissory Note. The Trust Deed
(Addendum 3) vested the legal title of Doms and McCoy in the Trustee, who held it in trust
for them and the beneficiaries. Any subsequent transfer by Doms and/or McCoy and/or
Domcoy was subject to this primary title. On August 30, 1983, Doms and McCoy
conveyed Rossi HUls to Domcoy Enterprises. (Exhibit 16) On August 26,1988, more than
three years after the complaint was filed and more than six years after the original deed to
Doms and McCoy, Doms obtained a deed from Domcoy. (Exhibit 17) Therefore, for the
first time since the start of the foreclosure action, Doms could claim some type of
ownership or color of title in the Rossi Hills property.
The trial court found on remand that the Sheriffs sale transferred the interests of
McCoy to Plaintiffs. (Order on Court's Minute Entry, at 9; Addendumll) However, the
court also found that McCoy had no ownership interest at the time the sheriffs deed was
issued. Id. Based on its findings, the trial concluded that:
The default Judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of
McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills has no effect on Doms's ownership interest
in the property and his ability to collect damages for breach of title
warranties, because McCoy had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the
sheriffs sale pursuant to the default judgment against McCoy was conducted;
and plaintiffs, therefore, acquired no ownership interest in the property from
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the sheriffs sale.
(Order on Court's Minute Entry at 5; Addendumll) This conclusion of law is incorrect,
contrary to the Court's Supplemental Findings and Conclusions. There, the court stated,
"The undivided interest of Michael McCoy was sold at Sheriffs Sale so that only fifty
percent (50%) of the property could be tendered for rescission." (Addendum 10). The
conclusion should be corrected for a variety of reasons.
First, the trustee holds the title of both Doms and McCoy in trust for them and the
beneficiaries of the trust. This trust tide may only be acquired by: (a) a release of the
Trustee's ownership, which is accomplished by the trustee's Deed of Reconveyance; (b)
foreclosure of the grantors interest by either following the procedure authorized for Trustee
foreclosure, or by foreclosing the interest as a mortgage, which is authorized by
UCA §57-1-34. The beneficiaries of this Trust Deed, Anderson and Scott, elected to
foreclose by proceeding under the provisions authorizing the foreclosure of the Trust Deed
in the manner provided for foreclosure of a mortgage.
A special execution was issued, and the Sheriff conducted a sale. Subsequent to the
sale, and after expiration of the redemption period, a Sheriffs Deed (Addendum 5) was
issued conveying McCoy's undivided one-half interest in the property to Plaintiffs, the high
bidders at the sale. No redemption was made. Doms' undivided one-half interest
remained in the Trustee, but Doms had transferred and conveyed such encumbered
equitable interest to Domcoy. Further, Doms in court reviewed the Sheriffs Deed and
insisted on a correction to indicate the deed only affected McCoy's interest. (Addendum 5)
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The sale and transfer by Doms and McCoy to Domcoy exhausted their right to claim
damages against Plaintiffs. The covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant and
does not run with the land._See, e,g., Beeslev v. Badger. 240 P. 458 (Utah 1925) (the
covenant against encumbrance was a personal covenant, "not running with the land." ).
Other authorities agree, For example, 7G Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law
of Real Property, at §3185 at 303, §3186 at 306 states: "Under the majority rule the
covenant against encumbrances is a personal one and does not run with the land. . . . A
covenant against encumbrances is broken on the delivery of the deed, if an encumbrance
on the land then exists." In addition, 6A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property, f900(5}
at 91A-150-151 (1993), states: "Because of the common law repugnance to champerty, this
cause of action historically was not transmissible to the successors of the grantee. Thus,
it did not run with the land."
This well established legal principle requires that Doms must claim under the deed
from Anderson and Scott. The covenant is a personal covenant and the measure of damages
would be any loss that might result by reason of the sale of the real estate to the
corporation. Doms was entitled only to one-half of the damages, if any, mat are properly
proven since he was oflty a one-half owner. For example, in the event of a sale of the
property, he would be entitled to one-half of the sale proceeds and no more.
Subsequent transfers between or among Doms and Domcoy could only affect the
one-half interest held by Mr. Doms which was subject to the trust deed. The transfer by
Doms of his interest in the real estate could only involve his interest subject to the Trust
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Deed. Supplemental Finding and Decree (Addendum 10). A grantor cannot grant an estate
larger than that which is vested in him. As a result, all transfers to or among Doms and
Domcoy are subject to this limitation. The portion of the judgment that purports to quiet
title without regard to the trust deed is without supporting evidence or law.
If the tax sale deed to Summit County was valid, it would have eliminated right or
tide of the trustee and Domcoy. Fortunately, the tax sale was not conducted properly and
Plaintiffs, in order to protect their interest, the interest of the Trustee and the interest of
Domcoy instituted action against Summit County which resulted in a judgment to the effect
that the tax sale was invalid and that Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., was the owner of one-half
interest, subject to the Trust Deed. (6896, 7069).
POINT V
DOMS WAS PRECLUDED FROM A TRIAL ON DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
WARRANTY.
Doms' final second amended counterclaim requested both rescission and damages
for loss of profits as a result of the alleged breach of warranty against encumbrances in the
warranty deed. (R. 237-42) Because both of these remedies were based on the same cause
of action, plaintiffs requested the trial court to order Doms to elect which remedy he chose
to pursue. (R. 4124-39). Before the trial on the issue of rescission, the trial court required
Doms to elect his remedy. (R. 7087) Doms elected rescission as the appropriate remedy.
(R. 7087) The trial court affirmed this decision when it stated, "You can't have it both
ways, you want a rescission and you want in the alternative. On the other hand, you want
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this Court to proceed on damages and on the other hand, I ruled against you so you want
it both ways. You can't have it both ways." (R. 7759) However, after Doms lost on the
remedy of rescission under his allegation of breach of warranty, the trial court allowed him
to proceed on the issue of damages under the same breach of warranty allegations.
In Cook v. Covev-Ballard Motor Co., 253 P. 196 (Utah 1927), the Utah Supreme
Court defined when a party who elects his remedy and fails is foreclosed from pursuing an
alternative remedy. The court stated:
The true rule seems to be (1) that there must be, in fact,
two or more coexistent remedies upon which the party has the
right to elect; (2) the remedies thus open to him must be
alternative and inconsistent; and (3) he must by actually
bringing an action or by some other decisive act, with
knowledge of the facts, indicate his choice between these
inconsistent remedies .... With such elements present, an
election once deliberately made by the institution of a suit, by
which the remedy is sought to be recovered, is final, and his
failure to secure satisfaction by means of the remedy which he
adopted furnishes no legal reason to permit him to resort to the
other.
253 P. at 199-200. Thus, the pursuit of a remedy to an adjudication forecloses pursuit of
the other remedy even if the pursuit of the first remedy proves futile. Mendenhall v.
Kingston. 610 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah, 1980).
Here, once the trial court held that Doms was not entided to rescission (R. 4244-50),
it should not have proceeded to determine whether Doms was entided to damages. All of
the factors listed in Cook were satisfied. Doms had two coexisting remedies on which he
had a right to elect. The remedies were alternative and inconsistent since both requested
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different remedies were based on the same underlying cause of action, breach of the
covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed. Finally, in open court,
Doms elected rescission as his remedy, a decisive act which indicated his choice between
the inconsistent remedies. Therefore, his failure on the breach of warranty claim when he
requested rescission as the remedy should have foreclosed the subsequent action seeking
damages. When the trial court allowed him to proceed, it effectively gutted the election of
remedies doctrine. Because Doms elected his remedy and failed to convince the court that
it was appropriate, the subsequent judgment by the trial court which held that damages
against Plaintiffs based on breach of warranty should be reversed.
Even if the court does not rule on the election of remedy doctrine, then the doctrine
stated in Christianson v. Idaho Sugar, 590 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1979), that there must
be a determination as to when Doms was evicted from the property by one having
paramount tide, and there has been no such finding or conclusion in this case. Justice Wolf
indicated that except for nominal damages for a technical breach, the grantee of the land
cannot recover a covenant against encumbrances until he has been damnified by the breach
thereof-either suffered a loss titled to the property, or by discharge of an encumbrance.
Pacific Bond & Mortgage v. Rohou 121 P.2d 635 (Utahl942).
At the time of the commencement of this action, the tide was vested in Domcoy.
There is no evidence to indicate that it was evicted from the property. Further, Doms has
not proven any damages that arose by reason of his ownership of the property. It would
be ludicrous to say that a person who buys a property with known encumbrances can
44

immediately sue the transferor for the loss of the value in the property by reason of the
known encumbrances.
The court should order that the case be dismissed because of Doms' election of
remedies or because he had not shown any damage.
POINT VI
ANDERSON AND SCOTT ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT
PROVIDED IN THE CONTRACT.
The promissory note that is supported by the trust deed provides that Anderson and
Scott shall have attorney fees for all matters relating to the collection of the amount due and
the protection of the title. Doms claimed fraud, and Anderson and Scott defended, and the
claim was eliminated. Attorney fees relating to this defense of tide should be specifically
awarded. Doms and Domcoy failed to pay the taxes on the property, which resulted in a
deed which would have eliminated the tide of the plaintiffs and the defendants. Anderson
and Scott were required to institute an action to void the tax sale. They were successful in
this action, and they are entided to attorneys fees relating to this matter, and all other
matters done in defense of the tide. The validity of the promissory note has been
established and all attacks against it have been defeated, which has caused several appeals.
Anderson and Scott, are entided to all attorneys fees incurred in the defense of the
promissory note and/or the trust deed, including the time spent on appeal. It has been well
established that the note has not been paid, that there is a major balance due, and that the
note provides for interest on the unpaid installment. (Addendum 3). Anderson and Scott,
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Plaintiffs, are entitled to a judgment of the amount due under the note, together with
interest, and attorneys fees incurred in this action, and thereupon a special execution should
issue requiring the undivided one-half interest in the property, subject to a special execution
and sold by the Sheriff at an appropriate sale. If a deficiency is obtained as a result of the
sale, then a judgment should be entered for such deficiency. UCA §78-37-1. If Doms, as
a result of this action, obtains a judgment, the judgment should indicate it effects only Mrs.
Anderson, Mrs. Scott and Mr. Scott, and not Dewey Anderson's estate as a claim has not
been filed against the estate, and a judgment cannot issue against it.
POINT VII
SETOFF WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO DOMS.
The district court, after exarnining the conflicting testimony of two experts,
determined that the purchasers had been damaged by an amount of money as a result of the
encumbrances that were on the property. Damages were not known at the time of the
negotiation for the sale; in fact, Doms knew the existence of the encumbrances prior to
completing the sale, and therefore it would seem, should have taken this into account in the
amount of the purchase price he agreed to pay. Nevertheless, the court fixed an amount
as damages for the existence of the encumbrances. The court had previously found that the
deed was a separate transaction from the promissory note and trust deed. The deed
involved four grantors and two grantees, or six persons, whereas the promissory note and
trust deed only involved four persons. The amounts for consideration involved in each is
entirely different. As indicated by the decisions of this Court, there has to be an identity
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of parties before the remedy of setoff is available. The most recent case is West One Bank
v. Life Insurance Co.. 887 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App. 1994). The court held that setoff was
not available as two separate contracts were involved. These contracts did not constitute
the same transaction. This is identical to the present case.
This matter was reviewed in the case of Ron Case Roofing v. Blomquist.
773 P.2d 1392 (Utah 1989), which indicated that if the damages claimed by the defendant
as a result of a breach are unliquidated, set off is an inappropriate remedy. See also
DeBrv v. Cascade, 935 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1997) (Setoff was not allowed because there
were two judgments: one was determined by trial, and the other by contract).
Also, if the court were to allow setoff, it would be difficult to determine what portion
of that setoff should be applied to the interest of Dewey C. Anderson's estate. The matter
was again treated by Mark VII Fin. Consultants v. Smedlev, 792 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). The court stated:
We simply hold that the plaintiff and the bank lack the mutuality of obligation
required for the pleading of setoff. As a general rule, in order to warrant
setoff, the demands must be mutual and subsisting between the same parties.
Any judgment for Doms should be revised to indicate that the Defendant Doms is
entitled to a judgment for damages resulting from encumbrances against Mrs. Anderson,
Mr. Scott and Mrs. Scott but not as against the Estate of D.C. Anderson as claims against
it were barred. Plaintiff should have judgment for the amount due on the promissory note,
together with interest costs and attorneys fees.
POINT vm
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THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS A
DETERMINATIVE ISSUE AND BARRED THE ACTION FOR
DAMAGES.
The record is clear that the statute of limitations had expired before the action had
been appropriately commenced.
The purchase and sale transaction was closed on March 22, 1982, and the covenant
against encumbrances arose on that date. An action to recover for breach of contract must
be within six years. (UCA 78-12-23(2)). The six-year period expired on March 23,1986.
A default judgment had been entered against Doms and McCoy on January 21, 1988.
Thereafter, various answers were filed, including the claim by Doms for damages under
the contract. The dates were confusing, and therefore, Doms filed a compliance agreement
therein declaring that the effective date of his answer and counterclaim is June 1, 1988.
The statute of limitations had expired on March 23, 1988. (R. 76-78). The appropriate
answer and counterclaim was filed on June 15,1988, both items being three months beyond
the statute of limitations affecting contracts and therefore barred by such statute. An
appropriate ruling on the matter of the statute of limitation would have precluded the second
section of the trial and saved both the government and the parties thousands and thousands
of dollars. If the statute of limitation is not applicable in this case, then the court should
courageously set forth the reason, thereby creating a signpost for future parties to judge
their cases.
Since its timing is such an important factor in the application of the statute of
limitations, for convenience, the critical dates are illustrated by the graph attached as
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Addendum 14. The court should find that the statute of limitation barred the action for
recovery on the contract, and the defendant's case is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief, plaintiffs request that hat portion of the
judgment of the trial court which denied Doms' claim of rescission and denied Doms'
attorney fees be affirmed, but that the portion of the trial court's judgment which awarded
Doms damages based on his counterclaim be reversed, and that the case be remanded to the
trial court for dismissal of Doms' counterclaim, and entry of judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, including an award of all requested attorneys fees.
DATED this [o_ day of August, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,

^ _— ^ " ^ Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants
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ADDENDA

Memorandum Decision (Not for publication) Entered November 4, 1994.
Pertinent Extracts of the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Trust Deed Note Dated March 10, 1992.
Trust Deed dated March 10, 1992.
Corrected Sheriffs Deed dated June 26, 1989.
Exhibit 78 in which Mrs. And Mrs. McCoy tender of voting rights dated on March 15,
1966.
Order Regarding Provisional Attorney's Fees dated July 6, 1988..
Plaintiffs Motion to Implement the Decree of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Memorandum Decision dated April 30, 1996, giving basis for no rescission
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as per Memorandum Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 1996.
Order on Court Minute Entry of May 6, 1997 and dated September 8, 1997.
Notice of Omissions
Other issues that may arise by reason of Footnote two (2) of Court of Appeals Decision
Timeline Graph illustrating the times each particular event occurred.
Determinative statutes and rules.

ADDENDA #1.

ADDENDUM 1

COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE:
Ellen Anderson, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. Anderson; Ellen Anderson;
personally; Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees,
v.
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E. Poms,
Defendant, Appellee#
and Cross-Appellant,

m
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Case No. 920653-CA

Ellen Anderson, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. Anderson; Ellen Anderson;
personally; Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Appellants, and Cross-Appellees,
v.
Summit County Title Company, a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendants,
and Appellees,
Ellen Anderson, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. Anderson; Ellen Anderson;
personally; Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott,
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JACKSON, Judge:
Appellants raise several challenges to the trial court's
determination to allow appellee (Doms) to proceed with his
counterclaim. Appellants' arguments relating to the counterclaim
include whether the statute of limitations barred the
counterclaim, whether the counterclaim related back to the date
appellants filed their foreclosure action, whether the deed Doms
obtained from Domcoy was valid, whether Doms was the real party
in interest, whether Doms was a remote grantee, and whether the
trial court improperly joined involuntary plaintiffs. We agree
with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his
counterclaim and find appellants' arguments to be without merit.
Thus, we decline to address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d
886, 896 (Utah 1989) (court may decline to address arguments
without merit on appeal).
In his cross-appeal, Doms asserts that the trial court
improperly applied the equitable doctrine of laches and refused
to rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. "To successfully assert
a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the
defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. Chandler,
733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987); accord Papanikolas Brothers Enter,
v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah
1975); Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (defendant must establish
prejudice before laches defense may be successfully asserted);
see In re Petition of Merrill Cook, 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah
1994) (denying petition because petitioners failed to act with
reasonable diligence and because relief requested "could work a
substantial hardship on the State").
The trial court made findings concerning Doms's delay in
bringing the action but made no findings as to whether appellants
were prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, we remand this case to
1. We note that we do not agree that any time property increases
or decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense
is automatically met. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 988
(Utah 1958) ("natural increment" in value of property does not
constitute prejudice in laches claim); see also West Los Angeles
Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th
Cir. 1966) (mere increase or decrease in property value does not
(continued...)
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the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact
relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in
Doms pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find
from the evidence presented that the appellants were prejudiced
by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the
remedy of rescission.2 Accordingly, we remand this case to the
trial court.

Nor^kn H. Jackson^oudge

WE CONCUR:

uudith M. Billings, Judge^

reenwood/* Judge
1. (...continued)
alone convert delay into laches) ; Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386
A.2d 1384, 1388 (R.I. 1978); (fact that property appreciated does
not in and of itself convert delay into laches); Lincoln v.
Fisher. 339 P.2d 1084, 1098 (Or. 1959).
A change in property value is one factor courts should
consider in determining prejudice. Lawson v. Hanves. 170 F.2d
741, 744 (10th Cir. 1948); Filler v. Richland County. 806 P.2d
537, 540 (Mont. 1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 159
(Utah 1976). Further, other courts have determined that a change
in property value did not prejudice landowners because the change
could be taken into account by a court of equity in fashioning a
just remedy. Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647, 658 (Haw. 1985).
2. Because it is possible that the trial court will order the
contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in the record
concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims
raised. However, in the event the trial court does not rescind
the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings
and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the
intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to
v
pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment
entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of McCoy's interest
in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the property and
any damages for breach of title warranties.
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ADDENDA #2.

ADDENDA 2
PERTINENT EXTRACTS FROM THE SECOND AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. "Plaintiffs in this case, as grantors, conveyed to Defendant Eugene E. Doms and
one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a form Warranty deed . . . " Record 6876.
2. "Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are encroachments such as
sheds, fences and decks owned and used by adjoining property owners to the west." Record
6878.
3. "The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to further the integrated
development of the three parcels and to equalize their position with the developers of the
Slipper parcel and Block 62. * Record 6882.
4. "Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased the Rossie Hills
Property and the Slipper parcel that the integrated development of the three parcels had failed
because of the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of the parties to reach
an agreement as to credits for each parcel." Record 6882.
5. " Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr. Sloan in the fall of 1981 and
knew that there were roads and sheds on the property. * Record 6883
6. "Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for the first time sometime
between October 22, 1981, and November 7, 1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up
and through 1984." Record 6883.
7. "It was not until Plaintiffs' action to foreclose was filed that Defendant Doms filed
his Amended Counterclaim in June of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed." Record
1

6884.
8. "Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages against the Estate of D.C.
Anderson within three months after the date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as
provided in Section 76-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate code." Record 6884.
9. "The Court finds that purchasers of real estate are not entitled to attorney fees
absent and express agreement providing therefore, . . . " Record 6885.
10. "The Court finds the plaintiffs complaint in foreclosure as well as all other actions
by the plaintiffs were not instituted or prosecuted in bad faith." Record 6885.
11. "The Court finds that Doms is not entitled to attorney fees." Record 6885
12. " . . . The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney fees for the
time spent on the collection of the Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but
not for any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in the Second Amended
Complaint." Record 6886.
13. "The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees for legal services
incurred in the prosecution of the collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set
aside default, to compel sanctions, setting aside the tax sale, intermediate appeal and petition
for extraordinary writ to the Utah Supreme Court." Record 6887.
14. "The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by said fences, and decks
are encroachments and constitute encumbrances upon the property." Record 6889.
15. "Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property on the date of the
delivery of the Deed, which was March 23, 1982." Record 6889.
16. "The aforesaid statutory covenants contained in the Warranty Deed were breached
2

upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. * Record
6890.
17. "The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed prepared at the same time
do not constitute a single contract. * Record 6890.
18. "The utilization of the Rossie Hills property is adversely affected by the
encroachments and loop road to the extent that the value of the property is diminished."
Record 6890.
19. "The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the difference in the value of
the property without any encumbrances minus the value of the property with the
encumbrances." Record 6891.
20. "Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two Hundred seventy-six
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($276,750.00) purchase price of the property, ..." in
the amount of Eight Two Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00) which represents the
earnest money payment of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) and the down payment of
Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00). Record 6891.
21. "Defendant Doms is further entitled to an additional offset of Eighty-Three
Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00), which represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as
a result of the encumbrances on the property as set forth above." Record 6892.
22. "Inasmuch as Defendant Doms' damages were not determined and a Judgment has
not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs' action for a judgment of foreclosure is
premature. * Record 6891.

3

23. "In regard to the issue of whether or not Defendant Doms was entitled to rescind
the contract, the Court concludes that Defendant doms was bound to take remedial action after
the Fall of 1981 which the Court determined to be the date he was made aware of the
encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the purchase of the Slipper parcel."
Record 6892.
24. "Once Defendant Doms knew of the road and the encumbrances, he should have
taken action within a reasonable time to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the
transaction." Record 6893.
25. "Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after he obtained
knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were upon the Rossie Hills property."
Record 6893.
26. "The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.,
as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed
which transferred legal title to Defendant Doms." Record 6894.
27. "Defendant Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim seeking damages against
Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred
by the three-month filing period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to
Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates to the issues of
damages." Record 6895.

END
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ADDENDA #3.

ADDENDUM 3

TRUST DEED
DO

N O T DESTROY THIS NOTE:

NOTE

When paid, fhJs note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered

to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

I

194,250.00_

P ^ k C i ^ , Utah
March 1 0 ,

—

a
» i*"-

82

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an
undivided 1/2 interest

.....9^„9^M?.J?-^

ITO H l ^ ^ ^ r a T O & NOAGgoLLARS ($..A?.5'250-°?..),

together with interest from date at the rate of Fr~~'!2^.
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

per cent (•*" * . %) per annum on

IWD THOUSAND IWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January
10, 1985.
Ihe entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985.
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of..~...?S±~;.
per
cent (J.8-.Q.%) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of *hi< note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.
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ADDENDA #4.

ADDENDUM 4
mz
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use

TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ..A9.!$.
between

?^ASL3...£!?^

day of

19.. 82

**?*}.
&..**&*&..*$.

.9°™?*.
... as TRUSTOR,

whose address is

285

cean

° °

ParIc

B l v d . , S u i t e 3 0 0 , Santa Monica, C a l i f * ,

(Strwt and number)

(City)

^^.S^^..^^.SPf^

90405
(Stat*)

as TRUSTEE,* and

..P.??:.v.???*ff?f^..?? „ ^ . ^ . u ^ ^ , t t l . ? : > * ^ v l 1 ^ infccraat and QrV? 9COT as t o «a
as BENEFICIARY,
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in

&xx*Lt

County, State of Utah:
SMG2L HO.

A l l o f Lots 17,13,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,23,29,30,31
au-^i 32, DLDCk 5C, I^arSc City Survey, acoccciing to tha amnied
p l a t thaiBCsf, a* filar! and of x*ooxti i n tha offloa of the
ourrlt Couiw/ l^corottr.

ptypm* :*>.

^11 cf iczt 17 *a*uT. 1?, .'lcvfc 3r, ?*d» City *-JT' ' , •ryrtling
fc. ch* i* • *>! Oiit. , , ^ o i \ ;r. r U V Vi ; ^ ' - c o r - . 1- the
•*tJ * ' < *n **}!-*t ^>»---/ • v . w , « * " '\vx>-.nX-; fV*rvfrcr»
o^' portion located vdthtn th» railroad r i g h t s of %*y * *
ceocribo'i in tl^c^z oartAin c t e i r w t a rooar\3*d em 2rttry NO.
317f. i n Dock C « t Pnot 401, Entry No. 13316 i n Book H &
Page 326, and firtry NO. 13610 i n Book H a t P*9« 373, record*
of SusndLt County, Utah.

PAROL NO. 3i

A l l of Lot 18, Block 59, Pmrk City S o n n y , according t o tha
fsoffikad PUt tharaof, MM f i l a d Mud of rooord In tht o f f l o * o f
tho Suninit Osunty Fecordar, moBpting tixrafrow any portiao
located within tha railroad right* of %*y ax daeacibed i n
these certain dacvaoonts raoordod MM Entry HD. 8176 i n Book C
a t Pag* 401, Entry No. 15316 i n Book E c t Pag* 326, cad Entry
No. 13610 i n Book H at Paga 373, roooxda of Suanit Cbbnty, Utah.

<v<f

•?
\

PIAINTIH-'*
EXHIBIT

\ --£—
1

5339,
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights,rightsof
way, easements, rents, issues*, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the nght, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal <um of S
'
. made by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may he made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
•NOTE: Trustee must be a mrmhor of the Utah State Bar. a bank, building and loan association or savings
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.

15. After the lapse of such t t
as may then be required by law following'
recordation of said notice of
default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given AS then required ^ law. Trustee, without demand
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place destgnatsd in **»d notice of sale, either as
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or psrcels. shall be sold), at public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the tune of
sale. The person conducting the sale may. for any c a u s e he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to
time until it shall be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale u postponed
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. T h e recitals in the
D e e d of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and ol the SMI^. including the payment of the T r u s t e e s and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee s Deed;
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
16. U p o n the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums
secured hereby immediately d u e and payable and fore d o s e this Trust De^d in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be
fixed by the court.
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or s o m e part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and
several. T h e term "Beneficiary" shall mean the o w n e r and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine a n d / o r
neuter, and the singular number i n d u d e s the plural.
19. Trustee accepts this T r u s t w h e n this Trust D e e d , duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as provided by law. Trustee b not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under ttny other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trustee.
20.

T h i s Trust D e e d

shall be construed

according to the laws of the State of Utah

21. T h e undersigned Trustor request* that a c o p y of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
Signature of Trustor

VXttSF

rctc

.

MICR&EL R«. MnOCY

(If Trustor an Individual)
STATE OF UTAH
JAH.
)FSurmrit
COUNTY OF*
On the

IPtfc

day of

?^nd»

, A.D. 19...?.?., personally

appeared before me
f3vKS*....A..Ui^..a^
t
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 5.he.X executed the
same.
Notary Public residing at:
My C

«2!SSi5,2n E x p i r e s :

Sale L*'-2 -Hty, fJtah

(If Trustor a Corporation)
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the ...

day of

appeared before me

t

A.D. 19

, personally

. , who being by me duly sworn,

says that he is the
of
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

acknowledged

Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Expires:

ADDENDA #5.

ADDENDUM 5

Ellen Anderson's Address:
2134 St. Maryfs Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

C O R R E C T E D
S H E R I F F ' S
D E E D
THIS CORRECTED SHERIFF'S DEED AMENDS, MODIFIES AND CORRECTS THAT CERTAIN
SHERIFF'S DEED DATED JUNE 26, 1989 AND RECORDED ON JULY 7, 1989 AS ENTRY
NO. 310188, IN BOOK 527, AT PAGES 253 AND 254.
THIS INDENTURE, made this 26th day of June, 1989, between D. Fred
Eley, Sheriff/ Summit County, State of Utah, party of the first part, and
Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson,
Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, parties of the second part.
WITNESSETH, WHEREAS, in and by a certain judgment and decree made
and entered by the Third Judicial District, in and for Summit County, of
the State of Utah on the 20th day of January, 1988, in a certain action
then pending in said Court, wherein Ellen Anderson as Personal
Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson
personally, and Jeanne Scott, Plaintiffs, and Michael R. McCoy and Eugene
E. Doms, Defendants, was among other things ordered and adjudged that all
and singular all the right, title and interest of Michael R. McCoy in and
to the premises in said judgment and hereinafter described should be sold
at public auction, by and under the direction of the Sheriff of Summit
County, State of Utah, in the manner required by law; that either of the
parties to said action might become purchaser at such sale, and that said
Sheriff should execute the usual certificates and deeds to the purchaser as
required by law; and
WHEREAS, the Sheriff did, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., on the 12th
day of December, 1988, at the County Courthouse in the City of Coalville,
County of Summit, State of Utah, after due public notice had been given, as
required by law and said judgment, duly sell at public auction, agreeable
to law and said judgment, all of the right, title and interest of Michael
R. McCoy in and to the premises and property in said judgment and hereinafter described at which sale said premises and property were fairly struck
off and sold to Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the Estate of
D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, for
the sum of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS it being highest bidder and that being the
highest sum bid at said sale; and
WHEREAS, said Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the
Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne
Scott, paid to said Sheriff said sum of money so bid, and said Sheriff
thereupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of such sale
in due form, and delivered one thereof to said purchaser, and caused the
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other to be filed in the office of the County Recorder, County of Summit,
State of Utah.
NOW TS INDENTURE WITNESSES, that the said party of the first
part, Sheriff aforesaid, in order to carry into effect said sale in pursuance of said judgment and of the law, and also in consideration of the
premises and of the money so bid and paid by the said Ellen Anderson as
Personal Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen
Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, has granted, sold, conveyed, and by these presents does
grant, sell and convey, and confirm unto the said party of the second part,
its successors and assigns forever, all of the right, title and interest of
Michael R. McCoy in and to the following described real estate forever, the
following real estate lying and being in Summit County, State of Utah,
being all right, title, claim and interest of the above named defendants
of, in and to the following described property to-wit:
Parcel No. 1:
All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder.
Parcel No. 2:
All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder,
excepting therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights-of-way as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401,
Entry No. 13 316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No.
13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County,
Utah.
Parcel No. 3:
All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to
the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents recorded as
Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in
Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at
Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah.
TOGETHER WITH an easement for utilities, including sewer
and water lines over and southerly five feet and
northerly five feet of the following described lots:
All of Lot 14, the South Half of Lot 15, Block 58,
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat
thereof as filed and of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville, Utah.

-2-

The above described real property is located in Park
City, Summit County, Utah.
TOGETHER WITH all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, to have and
to hold the same unto said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns
forever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said party of the first part has hereunto set
his hand and seal the day and year firsjt-^above j^rifcter

STATE OF UTAH
) ss,
Cc

ty of Summit

)

On the 26th day of June, 1989, before me, LINDA SMITH, a Notary
Public in and for the County of Summit, State of Utah, personally appeared
D. FRED ELEY, Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, personally known to
me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
who acknowledged to me that he executed the same as such Sheriff, freely
and voluntarily, and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned.
WITNESSED my hand notarial seal, this 26th day of June, 1989.

fing in Hen^fer, Otah
• ion Expires: July 15, 1991

-3-
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March 15, 1985

Mr. Eugene E. Doms
Domcoy Enterprises Inc.
23276 South Pointe Dr.
Suite 204
Laguna Hills, CA 92653
Dear Gene,
Pursuant to our discussion and verbal agreement, I hereby irrevocably tender to
you all voting rights for all my shares of stock In Domcoy Enterprises Inc, a Utah
corporation. I willingly take this measure to ratify the Indemnification
agreement I exercised in your favor in the lawsuit commonly known as Park City
Investors I v. Cen Corp., et al ( or Park Avenue Central).
This revocation of my voting rights is to allow you to freely make those business
decisions necessary to insure the continuity and viability of Domcoy as a
business entity in light of my current legal and business situation.
This agreement will continue until you and I mutually agree to the return of my
stock voting rights.

Very Truly Yours,

cc: Gerald H. Kinghom, Esq.

March 15, 1985

Mr. Eugene L Doms
23276 South Pointe Dr.
Suite 204
Laguna Hills, CA 92653
Dear Gene,
In order to show my support of the business decisions of my husband, Michael
R. McCoy, and per his request, I irrevocably tender my stock voting rights to
you under the same terms as outlined in Michael's letter of March 15, 1985 in
regards to this matter.

Very Truly Yours,

Marguerite McCoy
cc: Gerald H. Klnghorn
attch.

witmmmLmmmm*«• nn.it » M X U I * *.»~-».

MICHAEL A. MoCOY
TAX AND REAL ESTATE ATTORNEY
28029 OOnOTHV DANE . SUTE 102 • AQOUU WAS. CA 91301

Eugene E. Doms
PO Box 3614
M i s s i o n V i e j o , CA 92690
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ADDENDUM 7

MD.

FILED
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

*'.&(*• zt iunrr:r ^.ourtTy

S*"
WW

GY
Deputy Clerk

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate
Of C D . ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT,

ORDER REGARDING
PROVISIONAL ATTORNEY'S
FEES

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and
EUGENE E. DOMS,
Case No. 8339
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants•
-ooOoo-

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on
Defendant Doms' objection to the Order proposed by Plaintiff
setting aside Default Judgment and the award of attorney's
fees in the matter.

Plaintiff was represented by Irving H.

Biehle, Esq. and Defendant Doms was represented by Larry R.
Keller, Esq.

s*rf~i

^ « *

000245

After hearing argument of counsel and receiving pleadings
and memoranda of counsel on the issue as to whether or not it
was appropriate for the Court to have awarded all of the
attorney's fees incurred by counsel from the on set of the
case to the date of setting aside the Default Judgment, the
Court orders that the matter shall be taken under advisement
and considered anew once the case itself is finally disposed
of on the merits.
Furthermore, the Court denies Defendant Doms1 Motion to
impound the sum of $4,467.00 paid by Defendant Doms1 to
Plaintiffs' counsel as a condition of setting aside the
Default Judgment on June 1, 1988. The court finds that
because this sum has already been paid, that it would be
inappropriate for the Court to now impound it as requested by
Defendant Domsf counsel, but once again orders that whether or
not it was appropriate for the Court to award that sum as
attorney's fees for setting aside the Default Judgment is an
issue which will be reserved until the final disposition of
the case on its merits.
DATED this

5^ day of

lj- '^ ,/^/>

, 1988.

/ BY THE COURT:

HtfN. PAT B. BR!
Third District Court

- 2 -

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order, first class postage prepaid, this

day

of June, 1988 to Irving H. Biehle, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 50
West Broadway, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake City, UT

84101.

JlLUr) djuwk

-
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ADDENDUM 8

IRVING H. BJJELE, USB #A0317
CURTIS C. NESSET, USB #4238
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D. C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
IMPLEMENT THE DECISION OF
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ON REMAND
Case No. 8339

vs.

EUGENE E. POMS and
MICHAEL R. McCOY,
Defendants.

The Not For Publication Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals leaves
many issues that require further determination by the trial court. Some of those issues include:
1.

This Court must address and make findings on the effect of the intervening

conveyances and determine whether rescission is even possible or whether the intervening
conveyances constitute a waiver of either the right to rescission and/or damages.

2.

This Court must also address and determine the effect of the conveyance by Mr.

McCoy of his one-half interest in a trust deed and the further effect of the foreclosure on that
interest by an appropriate coun judgment which resulted in a sheriffs sale of the interest.
3.

The court must review and either revise or excise its findings and judgment that

title was quieted in Mr. Doms since such a judgment conflicts with:
a.

The prior coun order selling Mr. McCoy's one-half interest in the

property; and,
b.
4.

The interest of the purchasers at the sheriffs sale.

If the coun should determine that the transaction should be rescinded then it must

also determine:
a.

Whether a one-half interest in a real estate transaction can be rescinded.

b.

Whether the panies can be placed in the same positions which they

occupied prior to the transaction.
c.

If the rescission must be as to the total contract, then what kind of consent

must be obtained from the estate of D. C. Anderson and how the final judgment against
Michael McCoy will be vacated.
d.

How much money Mr. Doms is entitled to recover if the court adopts

rescission. Mr. Doms is certainly not entitled to recover payments made by Mr. McCoy
or payments made by Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., because to credit him with such

2

payments would constitute unjust enrichment and give him a judgment or credit for
moneys paid by other persons or entities.
e.

Whether prejudice exists which would prohibit rescission. -Such prejudice

was created by the great lapse of time and/or other events that transpired and the death
of D. C. Anderson.
5.

The court must find specific damages, if any, that result from the violation of the

known encumbrances and how those violations affect the undivided one-half interest of Mr.
Doms.
6.

The court must review the method of foreclosure if rescission is not granted since

if there is a variation from the statutory provisions relating to foreclosure, the court must make
findings and conclusions that support the new foreclosure proceedings which are not provided
in the law.
7.

Additional evidence and argument are required in relation to the attorney fees

involved in the foreclosure and the appeal in this matter in order to give affect to the contract
provisions both in the trust deed note and the trust deed requiring payment of attorney fees.

CONCLUSION
All of the problems created or noted by the court of appeals indicate the desirability of
a conference with the judge and the attorneys to establish priorities and methodologies and a

3

schedule for proceeding in order to comply with the "Not For Publication Memorandum
Decision" of the Utah Court of Appeals.
RespectfiiUy submitted this <~ '

day of August, 1995.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

4
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APri o t 1996

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of D.C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

: MEMORANDUM DECISION
:
:
:

CASE NO. 8339

:

EUGENE E. DOMS and
MICHAEL R. MCCOY,

:

Defendants.

In response to the Appellate Court's directive that this Court
make additional findings of fact relevant to whether the appellant
was prejudiced by Doms pursuing his Counterclaim for rescission,
this Court submits the following.
In order to properly address the issue raised by the Appellate
Court,

the Court reviewed

its trial notes and the Memoranda

submitted by counsel. After reviewing the detailed notes the Court
kept of the trial, this Court has concluded that Doms did not have
grounds to rescind the contract; therefore, the issue of laches
would be moot.
The findings of fact heretofore made by this Court found that
Doms had

familiarized himself with the property, knew of the

encroachments, the loop road and that Anderson's property

PAGE TWO

ANDERSON V. DOMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

development could be enhanced if developed with two other adjoining
parcels,

Doms proceeded to try and develop the property even

though he had no experience in developing real estate and was
unfamiliar with land development in the Park City area.
It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the
lure of a quick profit and did not take the time or make the effort
to make a sound economic evaluation for the development of the
property.
Doms7 motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the
slipper parcel so that an integrated development could take place.
However, he was unsuccessful in obtaining the third parcel which
would have made the project more feasible and profitable.
It is interesting to note that Doms did not raise the issue of
rescission at the time of the conveyance from him and McCoy to
Dancoy Enterprises or at the time the dissolved corporation,
Dancoy, conveyed the property to Doms, The actions and conduct of
Doms indicated that he wanted to own the Anderson parcel despite
the encroachments and prescriptive easement and not rescind the
transaction.
This Court found that Doms did not have the grounds for
rescission

based

upon

fraud

or

negligent

misrepresentation.

Plaintiffs had not made representations which were false or that

ANDERSON V. DOMS
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

would have induced Doms to enter into the transaction to his injury
and damage. Furthermore, there was no showing that the plaintiffs
were

in

a

superior

position

and

negligently

made

false

representations about the property which they could expect Doms to
rely and act thereon.
This Court now concludes that when Doms realized he did not
have the experience to develop the property, that he was in over
his head in the transaction, and when the bottom fell out of the
real estate market in Park City, he sought to rescind, which was an
unavailable remedy in this Court's opinion.

In other words, Doms

was suffering from buyer's remorse and trying to find a way out by
trying to rescind.
If the Appellate Court determines that rescission was an
available remedy for Doms, this Court then makes the following
findings of fact relevant to whether the appellants were prejudiced
by Doms' delay in seeking to rescind after more than five years
elapsed from the time he knew or should have known that there were
problems with the Anderson parcel.
The plaintiffs were substantially damaged by Doms' delay in
initiating an action to rescind for the following reasons.
1.

Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the

exclusion of the plaintiffs.

He purchased the slipper parcel and

ANDERSON V. DOMS
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attempted to formulate a plan

MEMORANDUM DECISION

for a three parcel integrated

development, but was unsuccessful.

The plaintiffs

are now

foreclosed from developing an integrated development because Doms
has an interest in the slipper parcel and the likelihood of Doms
cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated development is
remote.
2.

Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982,

1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and
required the plaintiffs to initiate legal action to clear the
title.
3*

D.C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction,

died while Doms was in possession of the property, thus making it
impossible to elicit testimony from the decedent.
4.

Doms' delay of five years before he sought to rescind the

transaction adversely affected the plaintiffs' opportunity to
resolve the encroachment and easement problems because witnesses
would be unavailable and memories are dimmed by the lapse of time.
5.

During the time that Doms, was in possession of the

property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value.
6.

Doms7 inexperience in developing property or inability to

sell the property impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of

ANDERSON V. DOMS
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down turn in the real estate market and the increased costs to
develop the property if they chose to do so.
7.

Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the

expense of the plaintiffs.

To allow that to happen would be

inequitable.
8.

Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the

doctrine of rescission.
This Court concluded that Doms did not have the grounds for
rescission but if he did, he failed to rescind timely.
The Court read the cases cited by counsel for Doms pertaining
to rescission.

Those cases are distinguishable from this case

because those cases dealt with conditions which allowed rescission
to take place if the conditions were not satisfied.

In this case

there were no conditions attached to the sale of the property which
would allow Doms to rescind.

In the cases cited there was only

passive action on the part of the parties. In this case, Doms took
charge and took steps to develop the property.

He engaged an

attorney to represent him, hired a surveyor, acquired the slipper
parcel and proceeded to develop the property.
Mr. Biele shall prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law in accordance with this Memorandum Decision.

He may also

ANDERSON V. DOMS
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incorporate those Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law found in
his supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Dated this cQ b day of April, 1996.

Q.,j ^ A

/7

JQJiN k. ROKICH
SENIOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this <^(o
April, 1996:

Irving H. Biele
Attorney for Plaintiff
33 3 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
James A. Mcintosh
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Larry R. Keller
Attorney for Defendant
257 East 200 South-10, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

day of
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JUN 0 5 1996
IRVING H. BIELE, USB #A0317
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

PUDDiSma COURT
Third Judicial District

JAMES A McINTOSH, USB #2194
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

JUN 0 4 1996
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D. C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,

vs.

]
]
])
>
])
>
]

EUGENE E. POMS and
MICHAEL R. McCOY,

]
]>

Case No. 8339

]\

Judge John A. Rokich

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AS PER THE MEMORANDUM DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

From the evidence and law adduced at trial of this case, the Court makes the following
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The real estate transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendants relating to the

Rossi Hills Property in Summit County, State of Utah, was an arms-length transaction conducted
in good faith and wherein the Defendant Doms had full knowledge of the encumbrances (Second
Amended Findings of Fact #41 and #43) and as heretofore found there was no fraud or
misrepresentation involved in the sale.
2.

Doms determined that the property value could be enhanced if it was developed

with two other adjoining parcels and purchased an interest in one of the adjoining parcels,
slipper parcel, so that an integrated development could take place and he proceeded to try to
develop the properties even though he had no experience in that area.
3.

Doms did not raise the issue of rescission at the time of the conveyance from him

and McCoy to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on August 30, 1983. (See Ex. 16), nor did he raise
the issue of rescission when he requested and obtained a warranty deed to the property from
Domcoy on August 20, 1988. Doms' actions and conduct indicated he wanted to own the subject
property despite the encroachments and prescriptive easements and did not act to rescind the
transaction.
4.

The findings of fact heretofore made by this Court found that Doms had

familiarized himself with the property, knew of the encroachments, the loop road and that
Anderson's property development could be enhanced if developed with two other adjoining
parcels. Doms proceeded to try and develop the property even though he had no experience in
developing real estate and was unfamiliar with land development in the Park City area.
2

5.

It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a quick profit

and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound economic evaluation for the
development of the property.
6.

Doms' motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the slipper parcel so that

an integrated development could take place. However, he was unsuccessful in obtaining the
third parcel which would have made the project more feasible and profitable.
1.

The Defendant Doms' claim for rescission was based on two theories, the first

being stated in the first cause of action of the Counterclaim which claimed a violation of the
covenants against encumbrances as the same were contained in the warranty deed; and the
second claim was contained in die third cause of action which claimed rescission based on fraud.
(See Second Amended Counterclaim).
a.

In relation to the first cause of action, the court found that all the

preliminary documents were merged into the warranty deed (Second Amended Findings
of Fact #54 and Second Amended Conclusions of Law #7) and the doctrine of Berestrom
v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) did not apply as this was an executed contract
rather than an executory contract as existed in Bergstrom v. Moore. Mavnard v.
Wharton. 284 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, (Utah Ct. App. February 23, 1996) citing other Utah
Appellate Court Decisions, some of which were discussed by this Court in its Second
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
b.

The Defendant Doms abandoned his claim for fraud and misrepresentation

as set forth in the third cause of action of the counterclaim and the court concluded that
3

there was no fraud or negligent misrepresentation in this matter. Plaintiffs had not made
representations which were false or that would have induced Doms to enter into the
transaction to his injury and damage. Furthermore, there was no showing that the
plaintiffs were in a superior position and negligently made false reprsentations about the
property which they could expect Doms to rely and act thereon. (Second Amended
Conclusion of Law #41)
8.

During March 1982 the Deed, Note and Trust Deed were all signed, delivered

and recorded (Exhibits #1 and #3). The purchase price was paid by cash and the execution of
the Promissory Note.
9.

The defendants entered into possession of the real estate and commenced

negotiations for a three-parcel integrated development with adjoining property owners (Second
Amended Findings of Fact #46 and Exhibits #81 and #82).
10.

The first offer for rescission by either of the defendant parties was made by Doms

through the filing of his second amended counterclaim on or about June, 1988, which was more
than six (6) years after the completion of the purchase agreement and after he obtained
knowledge of the claimed defects (R. 6882-3 and Second Amended Finding of Fact #43). The
Court found and now finds that this is a grossly unreasonable delay in requesting rescission
(Second Amended Conclusions of Law No's. 33, 35, 39, 40) for the following reasons:
a.

Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.

He purchased the slipper parcel and attempted to formulate a plan for a three-parcel
integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs are now foreclosed from
4

developing an integrated development because Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel
and the likelihood of Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated development
is remote.
b.

Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984,

1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and required the plaintiffs to initiate legal
action to clear the title.
c.

D. C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction, died while Doms

was in possession of the property, thus making it impossible to elicit testimony from the
decedent.
d.

Doms' delay of more than six (6) years before he sought to rescind the

transaction adversely affected the plaintiffs' opportunity to resolve the encroachment and
easement problems because witnesses would be unavailable and memories are dimmed
by the lapse of time.
e.

During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. and Summit County

were in possession of the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value.
f.

Doms' inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the property

impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in the real estate market and the
increased costs to develop the property if they chose to do so.
g.

Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the

plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable.
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h.

Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine of

rescission.
11.

On August 30, 1983, the defendants and each of them, by warranty deed,

conveyed the Rossi Hills Property to a corporation named Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibits
81 and 82) If Doms is claiming that this deed conveyed all of Mr. McCoy's interest so that it
was not subject to foreclosure, then it also conveyed all of Doms' interest and he would have
no basis for rescission or enforcement of plaintiffs' March 10, 1982 warranty deed to him and
Mr. McCoy.
12.

Neither of the defendants had title or color of title to the subject premises between

August 30, 1983, when they deeded the premises to the corporation, until August 20, 1988,
when the dissolved corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., delivered a conveyance of the subject
Property to Mr. Doms. (Exhibit 12).
13-

The trust deed required the defendants and each of them to pay the accruing taxes

on the Property (Exhibit 2) and the defendants failed to pay the taxes for the years 1982, 1983,
1984, 1985 and 1986.
14.

The defendants and each of them were in substantial default under the provisions

of the Trust Deed as they failed to pay the required real estate taxes which resulted in the sale
of the Property to Summit County on May 27, 1987 (Notice of Final Tax Sale - Exhibit 5 to
Complaint in consolidated case #10066).
15.

Subsequent to the said tax sale on May 27, 1987, Summit County, as a body

corporate and politic of the State of Utah, held the fee simple title to the Rossi Hill Property
6

until on or about August 24, 1988. See §59-2-1357, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
which was in effect at the time of the said tax sale and the Utah Supreme Court case of Hanson
v. Burns, 46 P.2d 400, 403, 406 (Utah 1935).
16.

The result of a valid Auditor's Deed conveying the fee simple title to the Rossi

Hill Property to Summit County, would cause the security represented by the Trust Deed to be
extinguished. See Hanson v. Burns, 46 P.2d 400, 403, 406 (Utah 1935). Therefore, plaintiffs,
in order to protect their security interests, were required to institute an action against Summit
County to set aside the Auditor's Tax Deed. This court found the sale to be unconstitutional and
therefore plaintiffs' Trust Deed was reinstated. (Consolidated Case #10066 and Exhibit 5 to the
Complaint in such consolidated case.)
17.

Defendant Michael R. McCoy defaulted in this case, a judgment was entered

against him (R. 34-40; R. 572,3) and in accordance with said judgment, his undivided one-half
interest was sold at sheriffs sale as per the Certificate of Sale which is attached hereto. There
is no evidence that Doms made any attempt to redeem the property at any time subsequent to
said sheriffs sale, nor did the said defendant, Michael R. McCoy, join in the actions for
rescission or tender his interest in the subject real estate. Under these circumstances McCoy's
former interest in the property could not be conveyed to the plaintiffs in any attempted rescission
by Doms,
18.

The defendants and each of them were in default as the payments required by the

Promissory Note to be made after September, 1984, were not paid (Exhibit 6), nor were the
taxes paid.
7

19.

One of the grantors. Mr. D. C. Anderson, died in Salt Lake City, Utah on

September 20, 1983, making it impossible to elicit testimony from him. Mr. Anderson's estate
was duly probated and his wife, Ellen R. Anderson, was duly appointed personal representative
of his estate and has been acting as such since November 30, 1983. Neither of the defendants
filed a claim for either damages or rescission against the estate. (R. 7988)
20.

From August 30, 1983 (when Doms and McCoy conveyed their title in the

property to Domcoy) through the date of the tax sale on May 27, 1987 (when Summit County
acquired fee simple title to the property) the corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., was the sole
owner of the Rossi Hills Property having acquired title thereto subject to the trust deed, by
reason of a warranty deed from both defendants to it dated August 30, 1983. (Exhibits 81 and
82). The Defendant Doms did not reacquire any interest in Rossi Hills Property until August
20, 1988, when the dissolved corporation, Domcoy, delivered a conveyance to Mr. Doms.
(Exhibit 17)
21.

During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, and Summit County had title

to the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value.
22.

At no time, by pleading or otherwise, did the Defendant Doms or any other party

owning an interest in the Rossi Hills Property make a legally sufficient tender the same to the
plaintiffs.
23.

The March 10, 1982 deed from plaintiffs to the defendants and involving the Rossi

Hills Property created a fully integrated contract involving two grantees or purchasers, each of
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whom acquired an undivided one-half interest. (Exhibit 1, Second Amended Findings of Fact
#54, and Second Amended Conclusions of Law #7.)
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Doctrine of Rescission was not available to the defendant and counterclaimant

Doms for the following reasons:
a.

The Defendant Doms obtained only an undivided one-half interest in the

Rossi Hills Property by reason of the March 10, 1982 deed (Exhibit 1) and a joint action
by all co-owners is required in order to repudiate or rescind the contract.
b.

The default of the defendants in failing to pay accruing taxes and to

continue the payments required by the contract constiuited substantial defaults and a
person in default cannot invoke the doctrine of rescission or repudiation.
c.

In order to rescind, it must be possible to return all parties to the status

quo and this is not now possible because:
L

no claim for either damages, rescission, or other relief was made

against the estate of D. C. Anderson and it cannot be required to regurgitate
payments made to it;
ii.

the defendant/co-owner Michael McCoy's undivided one-half

interest has been sold at sheriffs sale and is not available to return the parties to
the status quo; and,
iii.

Doms, being motivated by the lure of a quick profit, did not take

time to make a sound evaluation for the development of the property.
9

It would be inequitable to allow Doms to rescind under these circumstances.
d.

The Defendants had no right, title or interest in and to the real estate

subsequent to August 30, 1983, when they conveyed the Rossi Hills Property to Domcoy
Enterprises, Inc. or prior to August 20, 1988, when the dissolved corporation attempted
to convey the Property to Mr. Doms. This constitutes the entire pleading stage of the
action and since the defendants during that period had no interest in the Rossi Hills
Property, they could not tender the same to the plaintiffs.
e.

Since all prior Uniform Real Estate Contracts and representations were

merged into the final document, the March 10, 1982 deed, (Second Amended Finding
of Fact #54) this is a fully executed contract and the doctrine of rescission espoused in
Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) is not applicable since that case
pertains only to executory contracts where the sale documents are still in escrow and
have not been delivered or recorded and the purchase price has not been paid (Second
Amended Conclusions of Law #7 and #11).
f.

Doms did not have the grounds for rescission based upon fraud or

negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs had not made representations which were false
or that would have induced Doms to enter into the transaction to his injury and damage.
Furthermore, there was no showing that the plaintiffs were in a superior position and
negligently made false representations about the property which they could expect Doms
to rely and act thereon.
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g.

It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a quick

profit and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound economic evaluation
for the development of the property.
h.

Doms' motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the slipper parcel

so that an integrated development could take place. However, he was unsuccessful in
obtaining the third parcel which would have made the project more feasible and
profitable.
i.

This Court now concludes that when Doms realized he did not have the

experience to develop the property, that he was in over his head in the transaction, and
when the bottom fell out of the real estate market in Park City, he sought to rescind,
which was an unavailable remedy in this Court's opinion. In other words, Doms was
suffering from buyer's remorse and trying to find a way out by trying to rescind.
2.

The plaintiffs were substantially prejudiced as a result of:
a.

The failure to pay the real estate taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984,

1985 and 1986, caused Summit County, a body corporate and politic, of the State of
Utah, to hold a tax sale on May 27, 1987 and since no one made a bid on the Property
at such sale, an Auditor's Tax Deed conveying the fee simple title to the Rossi Hills
Property in Summit County was executed which if valid would have eliminated all right,
title and interest of the plaintiffs in and to the Property, Hanson v. Burris, 46 P.2d 400,
403, 406 (Utah 1935).
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b.

The failure to pay real estate taxes which resulted in a tax sale of the

subject Property to Summit County required plaintiffs to institute an action against
Summit County to declare that the Auditor's Tax Deed conveying fee simple title to the
Rossi Hill Property to Summit County was void thereby reinstating the plaintiffs' Trust
Deed which required the expenditure of substantial sums by the plaintiffs. (Second
Amended Findings of Fact, #42 and #43)
c.

Doms, Domcoy, and Summit County for over six (6) years (March 10,

1982 - August 26, 1988) had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs, changed the condition of the property in relation to adjacent properties and
foreclosed the plaintiffs from taking any prompt corrective action in relation to
encumbrances.
d.

The death of D. C. Anderson and the failure to file any claim against his

estate made it impossible to elicit his testimony in relation to the terms and conditions
of the sale or to require his estate to participate in any judgment or decree.
e.

The delay of approximately five years after knowledge of the encumbrance

and before requesting rescission was unreasonable and allowed market forces to adversely
affect the value of the subject Property to the prejudice of the plaintiffs.
f.

This Court recognizes the doctrine of prejudice established in the Utah

Supreme Court case of Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976), cited by the
Utah Court of Appeals in its Memorandum Decision.

This Court believes all the

elements found to exist in Jacobson are also present in the instant case as more fully
12

described in the Findings of Fact above including the fact that (1) an original seller D.
C. Anderson, had died and his testimony as to the transaction was no longer available;
(2) the Rossi Hill Property had a 50% reduction in value during the five years when
Doms and Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. had the exclusive possession of the property; (3) the
entire Rossi Hill Property had been conveyed by Doms and McCoy to a third party, to
wit, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.; (4) Doms as an equalfiftypercent (50%) shareholder in
Domcoy, received the full benefit of the value of the Rossi Hill Property because his
shareholding interests would have been increased by the value which the Rossi Hill
Property contributed to the net worth of Domcoy; and (5) at the time the defendants
conveyed their interest to Domcoy, the Property was worth as much as it was when they
purchased the Property from the plaintiffs.
g.

The undivided one-half interest of Michael R. McCoy, a defendant in the

case, was sold at sheriffs sale so that only a 50% interest in the Property could be
tendered for rescission.
h.

Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the

plaintiffs. He purchased the slipper parcel and attempted to formulate a plan for a threeparcel integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs are now foreclosed
from developing an integrated development because Doms has an interest in the slipper
parcel and the likelihood of Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated
development is remote.
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i.

Doms' inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the property

impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in the real estate market and the
increased costs to develop the property if they chose to do so.
j.

Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the

plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable.
k.

Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine of

rescission.
3.

The other matters referred to in the court of appeals' note 2 are reserved for

additional hearing and consideration.
DATED this ,4>/

day of

, 1996.
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ADDENDA #11.

ADDENDUM
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JUN 0 4 1997

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
KELLER & LUNDGREN, L.C
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal,
Representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,

ORDER ON COURTS
MINUTE ENTRY OF
MAY 6, 1997

Plaintiffs,
vs.

MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND
EUGENE E. DOMS,
Defendants.
Civil No. 8339

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal,
Representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.

]

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Plaintiffe,
v.
Civil No. 10066

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC, a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC, a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5,
Defendants,

The above-entitled matter came before me, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Senior
District Court Judge, pursuant to remand from the Utah Court of Appeals requiring
additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to the above-entitled matterThe Court having reviewed its notes and the memoranda filed by respective
counsel, concludes that the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by
Defendant Doms on March 10, 1997 are adopted by the Court, By the adoption of these
Facts and Conclusions, which will follow, the Court in its opinion has adequately treated
the effect of the intervening conveyance to and from Domcoy on Doms* right to pursue

2

his counterclaims and the effect of the Default Judgment entered against McCoy and the
sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest, if any, in Rossi Hills on Doms' ownership interest in
the property and any damages for breach of title warranties.
The Court allowed an additional hearing at which both parties were heard through
their respective counsel on January 28, 1997. Respective counsel also submitted
memoranda and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court.
Being fully advised of the parties' positions herein, the Court herein makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendants Doms and McCoy, as tenants in common, conveyed Rossi Hills

to Domcoy, Inc., a Utah corporation, by warranty deed dated August 20, 1983.
2.

The two corporate officers of Domcoy at that time were McCoy as

president, and Doms as secretaiy/treasurer, and the directors were Doms and his wife,
and McCoy and his wife.
3.

In March of 1985, McCoy and his wife irrevocably tendered all their voting

rights in their shares of Domcoy, Inc. stock to Defendant Doms and resigned from the
corporation.
4.
* g/"

Prior to this time, Doms' wife, who was never involved in the business of

Domcoy, had also resigned from Domcoy.
5.

Doms became the only officer and director of Domcoy, and still is the only

officer and director to this date.
3

6.

On December 31, 1986, Doms allowed Domcoy to be involuntarily

dissolved by the Utah Division of Corporations for failure to file annual reports because
Doms was the only remaining officer and director of Domcoy; and Domcoy, therefore,
no longer had the minimum number of officers and directors required by Utah law and
the Certificate of Incorporation of Domcoy.
7.

By August of 1988, when Domcoy deeded Rossi Hills to Doms, Domcoy

was no longer conducting any business except "winding up" its affairs as a dissolved
corporation.
8.

As a result of these transactions, Domcoy had no board of directors which

could adopt a resolution regarding the transfer of Rossi Hills, and Doms was the only
shareholder entitled to vote because McCoy and his wife had irrevocably tendered their
voting rights and fheir shares of Domcov stock to Doms in March of 1985.
9.

A sheriffs sale occurred on December 12, 1988, by the Sheriff of Summit

County and a corrected sheriffs deed bears the date of June 26, 1989, transferring the
interests of defendant McCoy in the Rossi Hills property to plaintiffe.
10.

At the time of the issuance of the sheriffs deed, defendant McCoy had no

ownership interest whatsoever in the Rossi Hills property.
11.

Doms and McCoy did not purchase the property as a partnership, and at

no time did either party hold the property as a partnership.
12.

Plaintiffs have not sued Doms and McCoy in this lawsuit as a partnership,

and have never obtained or attempted to obtain a Judgment against Doms and McCoy as
4

a partnership.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Despite intervening conveyances between Doms and McCoy to Domcoy,

the foreclosure upon title to the Rossi Hills property by Summit County, and the
subsequent reconveyance to Doms by Summit County, Doms presently holds clear title to
the property and his right to pursue his counterclaim is not affected.
2.

Plaintiffs lack standing to attack the validity of the Warranty Deed

conveying Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms which is a valid deed vesting title to the
property in Doms.
3.

Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as the real party

in interest, because Rossi Hills was never partnership property.
4.

The Default Judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of

McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills has no effect on Doms' ownership interest in the
property and his ability to collect damages for breach of title warranties, because McCoy
had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the sheriffs sale pursuant to the Default
Judgment against McCoy was conducted; and plaintiffs, therefore, acquired no ownership
interest in the property from the sheriffs sale.
5.

Since rescission has been denied by this Court based upon the doctrine of

laches, Doms still has available to him the remedy of damages based upon plaintiffs'
breach of the warranty against encumbrances.
6.

This Court now concludes that it has now met the requirements of the
5

decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in remanding this case back to this Court for
further Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and this Order shall be deemed final
for purposes of appeal on the date in which it is signed.
DATED this

ff

day of

5i.jP-

1997.

JOHN A. ROKICH
SENIOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be
mailed, by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this 3lH day of
Irving H. Biele
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

y HMf0,

1997, to:

James A Mcintosh
James A. Mcintosh & Associates
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

^MOn OuMfa
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COPY

IRVING H. BIELE
JAMES A. MCINTOSH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801)487-7834
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D.C.ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT;
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally;
and JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs,

*

N O T I C E OF O M I S S I O N S

vs.
*

EUGENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL
R. McCOY,

Defendants.
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D.C.ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT;
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally;
and JEANNE SCOTT,

*

Case No. 8339

Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendant.

*
*

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D.C.ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT;
and PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Case No. 10066
Plaintiffs,

vs.

*

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah; BLAKE
L. FRAZIER, in his official capacity as
Summit County Auditor;
GUMP &
AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah
corporation; EUGENE E. DOMS; and
Unknown Defendants described as
JOHN DOES 1,2, 3, 4 and 5,

*
*
*
*
*

Defendants.

The Court furnished plaintiffs with a Minute Entry dated May 6, and mailed May
7, 1997. This Minute Entry was apparently in response to Footnote 2 of the Utah Court
of Appeals Memorandum Decision, issued in this case under date of November 4, 1994,
wherein the Court of Appeals, in Footnote 2, stated:
"However, in the event the trial court does not rescind the transaction, the
trial court should note that its findings and conclusions do not adequately
treat the effect of the intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy or
Doms' right to pursue his counterclaim and the effect of the default
judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest
in Rossi Hills or Doms1 ownership interest in the property and any
damages for breach of title warranties."
POINT 1
The important portion is the requirement that the court ". . . adequately treat the
effect of the intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy or Doms' right to pursue his
counterclaims. . ."
The intervening conveyances are:
1.

The Trust Deed executed by both Mr. Doms and Mr. McCoy and securing
the payment of the promissory note which is being foreclosed in this
action. Comment: In order to assess the effect of the sheriffs sale of
McCoy's interest, as required by Footnote 2, it is necessary to show that
Mr. McCoy encumbered his interest and the effect of such encumbrance
in its relation to subsequent transfers.
-2-

2.

The Warranty Deed from Mr. Doms and Mr. McCoy to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a corporation. Since Mr. Doms and Mr. McCoy received full
consideration for the transfer by the increase of a value of their interest in
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., would this not prohibit Mr. Doms or Mr. McCoy
from claiming any additional consideration from the plaintiffs, since Doms
and McCoy were both sellers and their corporation was the buyer, and
they knew of the existence of the easements? The corporation has made
no demands against Mr. Doms or Mr. McCoy so they have not been
damaged, and obviously the statute of limitations has expired in relation to
any claim the corporation may have against them.

3.

The Deed from Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., the corporation, to Mr. Doms as
an individual. Comment: This intervening conveyance is very questionable as the directors had not authorized the transaction. There is no
evidence as to the resignation of the directors and in fact there was a
stockholders' meeting subsequent to the transfer of the voting rights that
recognized the directors and stockholders.

The court must also determine whether the covenant against encumbrances runs
with the land and therefore entitles a subsequent grantee of the right to sue an original
grantor that is removed by several conveyances.

POINT II
There is no discussion as to the right to foreclose the trustee as a mortgage and
the activity in relation thereto, or the fact that each transaction subsequent to the
creation of the trust deed would transfer the property subject to the trust deed and the
ownership of Mr. McCoy in the property.
There is no evidence that Mr. Doms or Mr. McCoy suffered damages by reason
of the transfer to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. Therefore, it is necessary for the court to
make a determination as to whether the covenant against encumbrances runs with the
land and would favor Mr. Doms as the owner of the entire fee as a result of the transfer
from Domcoy to Mr. Doms, or only on the divided one-half interest. There is also no
evidence as to damage as a result of the sale to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.
-3-

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs request that the court make such appropriate
findings as are necessary to comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeals; further,
to determine damages and whether Mr. Doms as a subsequent grantee is entitled to the
full measure of damages, or only to one-half of any purported damages, that may have
arisen by reason of the deed from plaintiffs to Mr. Doms and Mr. McCoy; and further, for
such other and further relief as seems appropriate to the court in relation to the opinion
of the Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of May, 1997.

IRVING H. BIELE
JAMES A. MCINTOSH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE
OF OMISSIONS was mailed, postage prepaid, this
following:
LARRY R. KELLER
Attorney for Defendant
257 East 200 South-10, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

-4-

day of May, 1997, to the
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IRVING H. BIELE, USB #A0317
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
JAMES A McINTOSH, USB #2194
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D. C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
;)
;)
;)

OTHER ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE BY
REASON OF FOOTNOTE TWO OF
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION AND
OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THESE
POST APPEAL HEARINGS

;

vs.

]i

Case No. 8339

EUGENE E. POMS and
MICHAEL R. McCOY,

]
]1

Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.

]

Other issues that may arise by reason of Footnote Two of the Court of Appeals' Decision
are as follows:

1

1.

The question as to whether setoff is an appropriate method of handling damages

if any are awarded.
2.

The methodology for the sale of the one-half interest of Mr. Doms which is being

foreclosed as a mortgage.
3.

Correction of the judgment which at present quiets title in Mr. Doms.

4.

Elimination in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the reference to

McHenry's Avenue as it was never involved in the sale of the property.
5.

The total amount of the judgment against Mr. Doms that is in favor of the Estate

of D. C. Anderson.
6.

The matter of attorney fees is also at issue as substantial fees have been incurred

in supporting or establishing the basis for rescission and in other matters relating to plaintiffs'
position in this case.

Undoubtedly, the Court will want either affidavits or a hearing in relation

to this matter.
7.

Does the review by the trial court of the facts and issues raise new questions as

to the Statute of Limitations.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of February, 1997.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

Irvi
Counsel for Plaintiffs

?

*

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
)SS:
)

ALICE ANDERSEN, being first duly sworn, says:
That she Is employed in the offices of Nygaard, Coke St Vincent, attorneys for the
plaintiffs herein; that she served the attached Other Issues that May Arise by Reason of
Footnote Two of Court of Appeals7 Decision and Other Requirements of These Post Appeal
Hearings upon the following by placing a true and correa copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Larry H. Keller, Esq.
KELLER SC LUNDGREN, L.C
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South 0 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and depositing the same, sealed, withfirst-classpostage thereon prepaid, in the United States
Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 7th day of February, 1997.

LAJLLAJ.

(JUAj<yLu*Ji<*y

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7th day of February, 1997

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:
Notary Public
CAROLYN S COOKSEY
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 64103
My Commission PXDTCS
JLT>3 2 2 , i:id
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ADDENDA #14.

Anderson & Scott v* Doms & McCoy

Oct.-Nov. 1981
Doms inspected
I and had actual notice
of encumbrances
(Findings of fact #33,
34, 41, 42 and 43).

March 23,1985
Three-year
Jan. 21,1988
Statute of
Default
Limitations
Judgments
on Fraud
March 23,1986 entered,
Claim expired.
Four-year
Aug. 20,1983
Statute of
Doms & McCoy
Limitations
Warranty Deed to
on Recession
Domcoy Enterprises
expired.
Inc. Exhibit 16.

/O'

Jan. 29,1988
Answer and
counterclaim
for recession
filed but not March 23,1986
effective as Six-year
judgment is Statute of
in effect
Limitations
(R 41-44).
on Contract

June 1, 1988
Doms files certificate
of compliance agreeing
that the effective date
for the acceptance of
the Answer & Counter
claim is June 1, 1988
(R-76-78 Addendum 21
to brief).
June 15,1988
I Ammended Answer and
I Counterclaim (Requested only
I Rescission and Lost Profits).

J'ftf I'&'J'M I'W. I'86 \'l!V I

1
July 5,1988
May 27,1987
Court signed order authorizing joinder
HW 1983
Tax sale deed
of Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Scott
D.C Anderson
to
Summit
as voluntary plaintiffs.
Estate probated
County Exhibit 5
Order authorizing filing of Second
and no claim
in consolidated
Amended Counter and the filing thereof.
filed (R007988).
•
1st
Claim.
Rescission (citing Bergstrom Moore)
case #10066.
June 6,1985
conditioned on tender of property to plaintiffs.
Mr Anderson
•
2nd Claim. Lost Profits (Doms abandoned this
March 22,1982
and Mr. Scott
claim (R-79 27-30).
Sale closed. Deed
file complaint
• 3rd Claim. Fraud (Doms consented to dismissal
recorded. Trust
to foreclose
of this claim (R-7763-64) and waived any right to
deed delivered
Trust Deed
consequential damages. (R-7971) or damages that
(Exhibits 1, 2-69).
as mortgage.
arise by reason of "Special" being placed on deed.

Aug. 20,1988
Doms Received
deed from Domcoy
(First time he
obtains title)
-(Exhibits 1 i & 66).

ADDENDA #15.

ADDENDUM

15

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
78-12-23(2) An action may be brought within six (6) years. . . (2) Upon any contractual
obligation or liability founded on an instrument in writing . . .
57-1-34. The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made, or an action to
foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property
shall be commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the commencement of an
action on the obligation secured by the trust deed.
Rule 15 (c). Amended and supplemental pleadings.... (c) Relation back of amendments.
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleadings,
the amendment relates back to the date of this original pleading.

